Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American
Family, and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy
INTRODUCTION

The freedom to marry is well-established as a vital personal
right in this country.' The right to marry, however, has traditionally been denied to lesbian and gay couples because states have
been reluctant to expand the definition of marriage beyond the
union of a man and a woman.2 While the regulation of marriage
generally belongs to the states,3 past Supreme Court decisions reI See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81, 82 (1987) (striking a law that limited
prisoners' freedom to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375, 382 (1978)
(finding unconstitutional a state statute requiring parents under child support obligations to meet certain financial requirements before being permitted to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12 (1967) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting
interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing
the right to marry as "older than the Bill of Rights"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 536-37, 541 (1942) (holding unconstitutional a state statute that provided for
mandatory sterilization of certain felons on grounds that marriage and procreation
are necessary for human survival); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (positing
that marriage is "the most important relation in life").
2 See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1188, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (validating a state's refusal to issue a marriage license to two men); Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. CL App. 1973) (upholding the denial of a marriage license to a
same-sex couple); Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626, 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (dismissing
an action by two females seeking an order to compel the county clerk to issue an
application for a marriage license); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn.
1971) (upholding a state statute denying a marriage license to same-sex couples),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); see also Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982) (upholding a federal immigration law
that excluded same-sex marriages for citizenship purposes).
3 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (citations omitted) (noting that the
state regulates the dissolution of the marital relationship); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 734-35 (1877) (recognizing that the state has the "absolute right to prescribe the
conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved"); John D. Ingram, A Constitutional
Critique Of Restrictions On The Right To Marry-Why Can't Fred Many George-OrMary
And Alice At The Same Time?, 10J. CONTEMP. L. 33, 37 (1984) (noting that the state has
the power to regulate marriage and define family relationships); see also Maynard,125
U.S. at 205 (recognizing the legislature's ability to regulate many aspects of the marital relationship from its inception to dissolution). Specifically, Justice Field stated:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more
to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body
prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations
it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.
Id.
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flect a willingness to protect the right to marry.4 The United States
Supreme Court, however, has never squarely addressed the legitimacy of same-sex marriage.' Given the changing structure of the
American family6 and the protections some states have extended to
homosexual couples,7 the Supreme Court will inevitably have to
Some courts have gone so far as to view the state as an actual party to marriage.
See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970) (citations omitted) ("Since marriage is of vital interest to society and the state, it has frequently been said that in every
divorce suit the state is a third party whose interests take precedence over the private
interests of the spouses."); Fearon v. Treanor, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (N.Y. 1936), appeal
dismissed, 301 U.S. 667, and reh'g denied, 302 U.S. 774 (1937) (citing Trammell v.
Vaughan, 59 S.W. 79, 81 (Mo. 1900)) ("There are, in effect, three parties to every
marriage, the man, the woman, and the state.").
4 See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 81 (preserving the right of prisoners to marry);
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375, 382 (striking a state law requiring parents under court ordered child support obligations to meet certain financial obligations as a prerequisite
to marriage); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (sanctioning the right of interracial couples to
marry).
One commentator has noted an "array of Supreme Court decisions discovering
and refining the constitutional right of marital privacy coexists uneasily with the
states' traditional power to regulate marriage and divorce." Hannah Schwarzschild,
Same-Sex Marriageand ConstitutionalPrivacy: Moral Threat and Legal Anomaly, 4 BERELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 94, 103 (1989). Another commentator, analyzing the respective interests of the federal and state governments in regulating marriage, has written: "Marriage is a highly regulated legal institution in which the state has traditionally asserted
a wide range of legitimate interests. Any constitutional inhibition on state power
would have to rebut this long historical tradition." David A. J. Richards, Constitutional
Legitimacy And ConstitutionalPrivacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800, 834 (1986).
5 Mary P. Treuthart, Adopting A More Realistic Definition of "Family", 26 GONz. L.
REv. 91, 107 (1991). Even more interestingly, the Court declined the opportunity to
do so in Baker v. Nelson, in which it dismissed an appeal for lack of federal question.
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
6 See Martha Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 1991 U. i.. L. RExv. 925, 930-32
(1991) (noting that the typical American family is no longer the traditional nuclear
family; it has been subsumed by a range of alternatives, including single-parent families and cohabitating unmarried adults); see also infra notes '10-12 and accompanying
text (discussing further the changing composite of the American family).
7 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791, 797 (Minn. CL
App. 1991) (awarding a woman guardianship of her incapacitated lesbian partner on
grounds that the couple constituted a "family of affinity"); State v. Hadinger, 573
N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding that cohabitating same-sex partners
are protected under Ohio's domestic violence statute); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co.,
543 N.E.2d 49, 50, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (determining that "family" as used in the rentcontrol laws included an unmarried lifetime gay partner); Bramlett v. Selman, 597
S.W.2d 80, 85 (Ark. 1980) (imposing a constructive trust upon property settled in one
man's name for the benefit of his male partner); Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901, 90203, 904 (Ga. 1979) (imposing an implied trust on the insurance proceeds of a house
shared by a homosexual couple for the surviving partner who had supplied part of the
purchase money after the house was destroyed by fire); cf. Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. Rptr. 869, 873-74 (Cal. CL App. 1982) (remanding to
a review board to determine whether a homosexual partner of a deceased employee
was a dependent covered by the Workers' Compensation Act); see also infra notes 20616 and accompanying text (surveying cases protecting homosexual relationships).
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consider the legality of same-sex marriage.8
Inextricably woven into the notion of marriage is the notion of
family.9 While states have continued to herald the virtues of the
traditional heterosexual nuclear family,1" this family composite, in
practical reality, is now the exception to the rule. 1 ' Today, the typical family differs greatly from the traditional one in structure, 12 but
not in purpose or function. 3 Current jurisprudence regarding
But see In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (holding
that a lesbian non-biological parent did not have standing as a "parent" under a domestic relations law to seek visitation rights with a child she and her ex-partner
shared).
8 See generally Ingram, supra note 3, at 39-44 (noting that the right to marry implicates equal protection, due process and First Amendment rights). Congress has primarily left the task of defining what constitutes an equal protection violation or a due
process violation to the judiciary. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Color-Blind CreedBlind Status-Blind Sex-Blind, HumAN RIGHTS, Winter 1987, at 32. This Comment will
analyze the right of same-sex couples to marry from a constitutional point of view. See
infra notes 119-63 and accompanying text (analyzing same-sex marriage under the
Equal Protection Clause) and infra notes 164-216 (analyzing same-sex marriage under
the Due Process Clause).
9 See Treuthart, supranote 5, at 96-97 (recommending a re-evaluation of the basic
assumptions upon which legal distinctions based on marriage and family status have
been made).
10 See Libby Post, The Question Of Family: Lesbians And Gay Men Reflecting A Redefined
Society, 19 FoRDHrmu URB. LJ. 747, 748 (1992) (defining the traditional family "as consisting of [a] mother, father, a couple of children and a pet").
11 See Barbara J. Cox, Love Makes a Family-NothingMore, Nothing Less: How the Judicial System Has Refused to ProtectNonlegalParentsin Alternative Families,8J. L. & POL. 5, 5
(1991) (noting that the past thirty years has seen a decrease in traditional families
with a simultaneous increase in alternative families); Post, supra note 10, at 748
("[T] he heterosexual two-parent, bread-winner father and homemaker-mother family
is now the exception to the rule.").
As of 1991, the number of families in the United States fitting the traditional
family structure had decreased to only twenty-two percent. Martha F. Riche, The Future of the Family, Am. DEMOGRAPHICS, Mar. 1991, at 44.
12 Alissa Friedman, Comment, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
ConstitutionalRequirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WoMEN's LJ. 134,
135 (1988) (noting that today's family represents a diversity of alternatives to the
traditional structure, including unmarried homosexual or heterosexual cohabitation,
group living, and single parent families). The last decade has witnessed the surge of a
gay baby boom. Jean L. Griffin, The gay baby boom: Homosexual couples challenge traditions as they create new families, CHI. Tm., Sept. 3, 1992, at Cl. It is estimated that about
four million homosexuals are raising about eight to ten million children. Id. at C2.
This estimate is based upon Alfred Kinsey's estimate that homosexuals comprise
about ten percent of the population. Id. Further evidence of this baby boom lies in
the fact that a New York organization of homosexual couples who have created their
own families has 1,500 households on its mailing list. Id. at Cl. Most of the members
are women, but male membership is quickly growing. Id.
13 See Treuthart, supra note 5, at 92 (contending that nontraditional families are
functionally equivalent to the traditional nuclear family because they promote the
same values and interests). Certainly, family values such as commitment, loyalty, and
intimacy are equally fostered by same-sex couples. DwightJ. Penas, Bless The Tie That
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4
marriage and family, however, has failed to reflect this change.1
Part I of this Comment outlines the purposes and benefits of
marriage, and the states' interest in regulating this most vital and
personal right. Part II explores alternatives to marriage such as
adoption, domestic partnership and contractual marriages. Part
III analyzes the judicial history of same-sex marriage. Part IV explains why the equal protection clause is an inadequate mechanism
through which to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples,
and Part V dictates why the due process clause should afford these
couples the same marital rights as heterosexual couples. Part VI
concludes that only by recognizing the legitimacy of same-sex marriage will the homosexual population be protected under the
Constitution.

I.

MARRrAGE: THE INSTITUTION

Marriage is more than just a legal union of two people-marriage is an institution. 15 Marriage, broadly stated, is an integral eleBinds: A Puritan-Covenant Case For Same-Sex Marriage, 8 LAw & INEQ. J. 533, 552-53
(1990).
14 Post, supra note 10, at 748-49. Specifically, alternative families are often refused
the significant benefits automatically conferred upon legally recognized families.
Note, Looking For A Family Resemblance: The Limits Of The FunctionalApproach To The
LegalDefinition Of Family, 104 HI-mv. L. REv. 1640, 1640 (1991) [hereinafter Lookingfor
a Family Resemblance]. For a list of the benefits bestowed upon legally married couples,
see infra note 20. But see United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
529, 532-33 (1973) (holding that the federal government could not constitutionally
limit the benefits of food stamps to households of related individuals); Braschi v. Stahl
Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (finding that the term "family" included an unmarried lifetime gay partner under an anti-eviction law).
15 ARmNE SKOLNIcy, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING MARRIAGE AND THE

FAMILY 194 (Little Brown & Co. 1973). In Stevens v. United States, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit articulated:
Marriage is a consentient covenant. It is a contract in the sense that it is
entered into by agreement of the parties. But it is more than a civil
contract between them, subject to their will and pleasure in respect of
effects, continuance, or dissolution. It is a domestic relation having to
do with the morals and civilization of a people. It is an essential organization in every well organized society.
Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120, 123 (10th Cir. 1944).
American family law, including marriage, evolved from English canon and common law. Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage:A Review, 17 WM. MrrcuHELL L.
REV. 539, 541 (1991). The first formal marriage ceremonies were performed in the
eighteenth century. Id. In early America, informal or common law marriages were
commonplace because a clergy member or a civil officer was not always available to
perform a formal marriage ceremony. See generally52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage§ 45 (1970)
(stating that common-law marriage developed in America because of the inconvenience in traveling to obtain a marriage license and the scarcity of individuals permitted to perform ceremonies). Common law marriages, however, are generally not
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ment of cultural stabilization, necessary to establish and maintain
social structure. 6 Specifically, the institution of marriage promotes
community' 7 and individual values," s and is viewed as essential to
the maintenance of liberty and government. 9
recognized today. Id. at § 46. See also Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 305-06, 309
(Wis. 1987) (holding that the statutes governing the division of property between
married couples do not apply to unmarried persons living in a "marriage-like" relationship); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595 (Wyo. 1981) (stating that Wyoming
does not recognize common law marriages); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1327
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (citing IND. CODE § 31-1-6-1 (1992)) (noting Indiana's statutory
prohibition of the doctrine of common law marriage); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d
1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979) (pointing out that common law marriages in Illinois had been
abolished since 1905).
16 Schwarzschild, supra note 4, at 110. Schwarzschild expounded: "In Western society, certainly, marriage's historical ties both to religious authority and to systems of
property relations have ensured it a role that reaches far beyond the 'private' sphere."
Id.
Marriage breeds stability and reduces the social costs resulting from the breakdown of relations. Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, And The Constitution: On The Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 981, 991 (1991). Gay and lesbian
couples, like heterosexual couples, also promote these interests. Id.
17 See Bruce C. Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus Of Marriage,Kinship, And Sexual Privacy - Balancing The Individual And Social Interests, 81 MIcH. L. Rxv. 463, 476 (1983)
("Through the commitments of marriage and kinship both children and parents experience the need for and the value of authority, responsibility, and duty in their most
pristine forms."). Family bonds teach individuals "the attitudes and skills that sustain
an open society." Id. at 472. Similarly, marriage fortifies society by providing a forum
for potential happiness while breeding responsibility. Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From
This Day Forward:A Feminine Discourse on Homosexual Marriage,97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1799
(1988); see also Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1983) (stating that "[t]he
policy favoring marriage is not rooted only community mores. It is also rooted in the
necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational
rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society").
18 See G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYrON L.
REv. 541, 542 n.8 (1985) (hereinafter Buchanan, The Linchpin Issue] (noting that the
institution of marriage promotes many individual values, including generosity, fidelity, integrity, self-respect, and sustained joy). The Supreme Court has noted that the
importance of family ties to both individuals and society is generated by the emotional attachments that develop from the intimacy of everyday life. Smith v. Org. of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)). Individuals also benefit from marriage in that
these relationships help "foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the state." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619
(1984) (citations omitted).
19 Schwarzschild, supra note 4, at 107. In State v. Tutty, a Georgia circuit court
stated that "in this country, the home life of the people, their decency and their morality, are the bases of that vast social structure of liberty, and obedience to law, which
excites the patriotic pride of our countrymen and the admiration of the world." State
v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 762 (1890). Similarly, almost a century later, the Supreme Court
noted that "[t ] he institution of marriage has played a critical role.., in developing the
decentralized structure of our democratic society." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
256-57 (1983).
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The status of marriage automatically bestows a myriad of entitlements upon the married couple. 20 First, marriage serves as a vehicle through which couples gain social acceptance.21 Second,
marriage triggers state recognition and protection2 2 of legal and
economic benefits, such as inheritance and property rights as well
as tax benefits. 23 These benefits evidence the value society places
upon marriage and family, 24 and reflect the family's role as society's basic economic unit.25 Insofar as these marital benefits 26are
is a source of oppression.

denied to same-sex couples, the law

20 See Treuthart, supra note 5, at 92 (noting that legally married couples are entitled to recovery for loss of consortium and lower insurance premiums); Wilson, supra
note 15, at 540 (listing parenting and custody, health care for couples and their dependents, bereavement leave, inheritance and property rights, social security, and
pensions as benefits of marriage). One of the most important benefits conferred
upon married couples are tax benefits. See I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1992) (allowing married
couples to file joint income taxes); I.R.C. § 2056 (1992) (providing a tax exemption
for spouses inheriting from their mate's estate; no such exemption is available for
unmarried partners).
Financial support upon separation is also accorded to married couples.
Treuthart, supra note 5, at 92. Currently, however, there are no statutes or legal procedures that ensure fair treatment between same-sex partners upon separation.
Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments In Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REv. 311,
325 (1980-81) [hereinafter Rivera, Recent Developments].
Surviving spouses are also provided with veteran's benefits upon the death of a
veteran spouse. 38 U.S.C. § 411 (1988); see also McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 56
(8th Cir. 1976) (denying veterans benefits on the grounds that same-sex marriages
were prohibited under Minnesota law).
21 See Wilson, supra note 15, at 543 (urging that marriage is especially vital for
same-sex couples in search of social acceptance). It is dubious, however, whether the
recognition of same-sex marriage would provide a vehicle for social change, because
same-sex marriage is not uniformly championed among homosexuals. Ruth Colker,
Marriage, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 321, 321 (1991). Opponents of same-sex marriage
contend that legalization of same-sex marriage is no guarantee of social acceptance.
See Nitya Duclos, Some ComplicatingThoughts On Same-Sex Marriage,1 LAW & SExUALITr
31, 51-52 (1991) (contending that legalization of same-sex marriage will lead merely
to toleration as opposed to respect). Professor Duclos further argued that if legal
marital status were available to lesbian and gay couples, they would be under strong
pressure to marry, because benefits would only be available on that basis. Id. at 50-51.
22 Lewis, supra note 17, at 1798. This recognition and protection promotes "a
sense of belonging to the community through mutual public identification." Id.
23 See supra note 20 (listing marital benefits).
24 Friedman, supra note. 12, at 155.
25 Treuthart, supra note 5, at 92. Professor Treuthart asserted that at least one
reason economic benefits are conferred upon married persons is to encourage marriage because it promotes certain fundamental values which are beneficial to the persons involved and to society. Id. at 92-93.
26 See HAYDEN CuRRY & DENIS CuIroRD, A LEcAi. GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY
Coupi.ss Ch.1, at 1:1 (6th ed. 1991) (asserting that sodomy laws and the specific exclusion of homosexuals from the military has "codified homophobia"). Examples of
the oppression of homosexuals lie in sodomy laws, exclusion from military opportunities, and prohibitions against child custody. Id. Many states' refusal to permit same-
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While states undoubtedly have a strong interest in regulating
marriage, 27 the reasons proffered for denying this right to same-sex
couples are unpersuasive. 28 The least prejudicial interest advanced
by states for proscribing same-sex marriage is the encouragement
of procreation.2 9 Advocates maintain that this interest is justified
because procreation is essential to the survival of the human race. 0
This argument, however, fails for several reasons. First, the
Supreme Court's privacy decisions, which grant individuals the
right to contraception 3l and abortion, 2 question the legitimacy of
sex marriage is also unduly oppressive because state interests are served equally well
by both heterosexual and homosexual unions. Strasser, supra note 16, at 1015. For a
discussion of the states' interest in marriage, see supranotes 15-19 and accompanying
text.
Homosexuals are also oppressed in that they cannot sue in tort for certain actions. Penas, supra note 13, at 549. See also Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 582, 588,
589-90 (Cal. 1988) (holding that an unmarried partner could not collect damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of consortium); Coon v. Joseph, 237
Cal. Rptr. 873, 874, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an intimate homosexual
relationship does not fall within the "close relationship" standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Rivera, Recent Developments, supra note 20, at 312 (insisting
that the disparate treatment of legally recognized heterosexual unions and same-sex
unions is a problem to be taken seriously).
27 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing state regulation of
marriage).
28 See generally Friedman, supra note 12, at 160-69 (scrutinizing and denouncing
state interests advanced in support of denying homosexual couples marriage
licenses); Wilson, supranote 15, at 544 (rejecting as antiquated justifications put forth
for disallowing same-sex marriage).
29 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (noting that the state has a
basic interest in encouraging reproduction given that procreation is essential for the
survival of the human race); Friedman, supra note 12, at 161 (arguing that legitimization of same-sex marriage would decrease incentive to enter a heterosexual union,
which is more likely to result in offspring). Furthermore, courts have found procreation sufficient to prohibit same-sex couples from marrying. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara,
522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (reasoning that homosexuals' inability to
propagate the human race should preclude them from marrying).
30 Friedman, supra note 12, at 161. Advocates further maintain that even though
homosexual couples do raise children, heterosexual unions are far more likely to result in procreation. Id. Moreover, recognition of a "homosexual union pairs individuals who are capable of natural procreation in a relationship incapable of natural
procreation." Id.
31 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681, 700 (1977) (upholding the invalidation of a New York law prohibiting the sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors under age 16); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-42, 454-55
(1972) (finding unconstitutional a statute permitting distribution of contraceptives
only to married people); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (determining that the right of married people to use contraceptives falls within the due
process right to privacy).
32 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 58, 70, 74-75
(1976) (barring states from giving parents or spouse absolute veto power over a woman's decision to abort); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding that the
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the states' interest in increasing the population.3 3 Second, states
do not deny marital rights to heterosexual couples unable or unwilling to procreate.3 4 Third, lesbian and gay couples can and do
raise their own families.3 5
Protection of the traditional family has also been enumerated
as a reason to prohibit same-sex marriage. 36 Proponents of sameright to privacy gives a woman the constitutional right to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy). For an excellent discussion of developments in the undeniably controversial area of abortion, see Mary Edwards & Brian D. Lee, Note, A Regulation Requiring A Woman to Notify Her Husband Before Receiving An Abortion Is Impermissible
Because It Unduly Burdens The Woman's Abortion Right, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 255, 322
(1992) (calling for specific guidelines to clarify how far a woman's right to abort
extends).
33 Friedman, supra note 12, at 161. Friedman additionally warned that the real
threat to the human race is overpopulation not underpopulation. Id.
34 Wilson, supra note 15, at 544. Childless same-sex couples and childless heterosexual couples are "similarly situated" in that they are both unable or unwilling to
procreate. Leo Sullivan, Same Sex Marriageand the Constitution, 6 U.C. DAviS L. REv.
275, 280 (1973). The Equal Protection Clause requires that similarly situated people
be treated alike; thus states cannot reasonably prohibit same-sex couples from marrying based upon an inability to procreate. Id. at 278, 280.
35 Post, supra note 10, at 756. Gay and lesbian couples have used adoption and
artificial insemination as a means to have children of their own. Id.; see also Note,
Developments In The Law, The ConstitutionAnd The Family, 93 Hxv. L. REv. 1156, 1285
(1980) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (maintaining that the fundamentals of
childraising are the same for both homosexual and heterosexual parents); Note, Joint
Adoption: A Queer Adoption, 15 VT. L. REv. 197, 199, 204-18 (1990) (arguing for joint
adoption by homosexual couples).
The most controversial means by which a gay or lesbian can become a parent is
adoption. Jeffrey S. Loomis, Comment, An Alternative Placementfor Children in Adoption
Law: Allowing Homosexuals TheRight to Adopt, 18 OHo N.U. L. REv. 631, 632-64 (1992)
(surveying the law governing adoption of minors by homosexuals). The case law governing adoption by homosexuals is scant, with at least two courts coming out different
ways on the issue. CompareIn reAppeal in Pima Cty. Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d
830, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming a trial court certification of a homosexual as
unacceptable to adopt a child) with In reAdoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 885,
886, 890 (Ohio 1990) (upholding trial court's placement of a child with a
homosexual).
36 See Buchanan, The Linchpin Issue, supra note 18, at 565-70 (discussing the importance of heterosexual marriage in promoting certain individual and community values, such as allegiance to family life, conventional marriage, and childbearing). The
author contended:
The majority, therefore, may reasonably believe that legal recognition
of same-sex marriage would destroy the exclusiveness of the present position held by opposite-sex marriage in the eyes of society and, by so
doing, would impair the ability of opposite-sex marriage to advance the
individual and community values that it has traditionally promoted.
Id. at 567.
One commentator has also observed that "[t]he law accords legal benefits to the
married and legal disabilities to the unmarried for its own moral health and ultimate
survival... ." PeterJ. Riga, The Supreme Court's View Of MarriageAnd The Family: Tradition or Transition?, 18 J. FAm. L. 301, 310 (1980). For example, the protection and
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sex marriage argue that states are overly concerned with maintaining the traditional family composite; the key to a stable society,
however, is the promotion of family values.5 7 Similar to heterosexual pairs, homosexual couples further traditional marriage and
family values such as commitment, loyalty, and intimacy.38
II.

ALTERNATIVES TO MARRIAGE

Legal alternatives to marriage are available to gay and lesbian
couples. These alternatives include adult adoption, 9 domestic
partnership,' and contract drafting.4 These devices, however, are
limited in that they merely provide a means through which to establish property rights. 42 More specifically, none grant same-sex

couples a recognized legal status similar, let alone equal, to that of
marriage, nor uniformly define homosexual unions.4" These alterpromotion of the traditional family has guided the Supreme Court in reviewing laws
dealing with illegitimacy. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164,
167 n.3, 168 (1972) (acknowledging the inferior status of illegitimate children in recovering their parent's Workmen's Compensation benefits because of the importance
of the state's interest in promoting the traditional family); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532, 533, 539-40 (1971) (upholding a Louisiana intestate succession scheme which
prevented illegitimate children from sharing equally with legitimate children in their
father's estate). Whether such protection is appropriate today is precisely the issue
addressed in this Comment. See infra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion
of how the virtues of the traditional family have been used as ajustification for prohibiting same-sex marriage.
37 See genera/ly Penas, supra note 13, at 552-53. Opponents of same-sex marriage
claim that legalization would debilitate the values associated with heterosexual marriage and traditional family life. Id. at 552. That same-sex marriage furthers the same
values and interests as heterosexual marriage, such as commitment and loyalty, illustrates the illogic of this argument. Id. at 552-53.
38 Id. at 552-53; Friedman, supra note 12, at 169 (stressing that since homosexual
and heterosexual couples promote the same family values, it does not make sense to
maintain that family values are protected by precluding homosexual marriage).
Friedman contends that "[t]he notion of a lesbian or gay family is novel and foreign to
the majority." Id. Homosexual relationships last because they parallel many of the
"interpersonal arrangements" seen in heterosexual relationships. C.A. TRIPP, T14E
HOMOSEXUAL MATRix 159 (McGraw-Hill 1975). For example, the division of leadership and decision-making in homosexual relationships generally parallels that in heterosexual unions. Id. at 162.
39 See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (discussing adult adoption as an
alternative to marriage).
40 See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing domestic partnership).
41 See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text (surveying the contract alternative
to marriage).
42 Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family, Marriage,And The SameSex Couple, 12 CARxozo L

REv. 681, 688 (1990). See also ROBERTA ACHTENBERG & BARBARA J. GILCHRssT, SExuAL
ORIENTATION AND Tr LAw § 1.05(2) (a) (Clark, Boardman & Callaghan 1992) (stating that adoption "suggests itself as a technique for insuring that the lover of a lesbian
or gay testator inherits the testator's property").
43 Zimmer, sura note 42, at 688.
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natives, given their limited scope, therefore, do not adequately rectify the inherent unfairness of preventing same-sex couples from
enjoying the legal benefits of marriage.4 4
A.

Adult Adoption

Gay and lesbian couples have used adult adoption to legalize
their unions.4 5 Adoption is the legal process in which a person
acquires parental rights and responsibilities with respect to another
person. Adoption results in an irrevocable legal union between the
adopter and the adoptee and is usually characterized as a parentchild relationship. 46 In a same-sex marriage, homosexual individuals adopt their mates to create a legal status that permits them to
overcome obstacles relating to inheritance and housing, and to
create a legally protected family unit.47 Notably, although only
New York has repeatedly addressed the quasi-marital aspect of
adult adoptions, the results have been inconsistent. 48
44 See id. at 688-97 (surveying alternatives to marriage and ultimately rejecting
them on the grounds that they emphasize the differences rather than the similarities
between homosexual and heterosexual couples).
45 Peter N. Fowler, Comment, Adult Adoptions: A "New" Legal Tool For Lesbians And
Gay Men, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 667, 668 (1984). Some statutes have expressly
authorized adult adoption. See, e.g., Apt& CODE ANN. § 9-9-203 (Michie 1991) ("Any
individual may be adopted."); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A.22-1 to -3 (West 1987) (expressly
permitting adult adoption); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 110 (Consol. 1979 & Supp. 1991)
("An adult unmarried person ... may adopt another person."); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-15-02 (1991) ("Any individual may be adopted."). In NewJersey, however, adoption is probably not a reasonable alternative for same-sex couples because the adopter
must be ten years older than the adoptee. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-22-2 (West 1987).
Only Nebraska prohibits adult adoption. See Appeal of Ritchie, 53 N.W.2d 753, 754,
755 (Neb. 1952) (denying adult adoption based on Nebraska's statutory scheme
which only expressly authorized the adoption of minors).
46 Fowler, supra note 45, at 668-69. See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 110 (Consol.
1979 and Supp. 1991) ("Adoption is the legal proceeding whereby a person takes
another person into the relation of child .... .").
47 ACHrENBERG & Gic-Irusr, supra note 42, at § 1.05(2) (a)-(g). Often, the participants to adult adoption express their desire to legally formalize their personal commitment to each other. See, e.g., In re Adult Anonymous II, 88 A.D.2d 30, 32 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982) (acknowledging that the couple desired to display openly their commitment to each other); In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 528
(Faro. Ct. 1981) (noting that the couple "wished to establish a more permanent legal
bond").
Adoption may also permit the couple to acquire employment and insurance benefits. ACHTENBERG & GmcmnusT, supra note 42, at § 1.05(2)(d)-(e). Adoption may
evidence a close relationship when a lesbian or gay partner is designated a beneficiary
in a life insurance policy. Id.; see also Fowler, supra note 45, at 679-88 (enumerating
motives underlying adult adoption: inheritance, recognition of "next-of-kin" relationships, housing restrictions, insurance and employment benefits, immigration, and the
creation of a family unit).
48 Compare 333 E. 53rd St. Assocs. v. Mann, 121 A.D.2d 289, 292 (N.Y. App. Div.
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Even if same-sex adult adoption was accepted uniformly by the
courts, it would remain an inadequate option for obtaining legal
familial status because adoption defines the relationship as parentchild, rather than marital, and does not sufficiently define the accompanying rights.4 9 Highlighting this inadequacy is the fact that
couples who use adoption as a means of creating a legal relationship cannot forego a will and rely on intestacy laws for property
inheritance purposes.50 Similarly, adult adoption does not assure
1986) (holding that adult adoption is permitted for inheritance purposes) and Adult
Anonymous II, 88 A.D.2d at 31 (stating that "adoption of an adult by an adult is permissible so long as the parties' purpose is neither insincere nor fraudulent") and
Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 531 (proclaiming that adult adoption
between two consenting adults will be permitted when the purpose of the adoption is
for legitimate legal and economic reasons) with In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471
N.E.2d 424, 427 (N.Y. 1984) (rejecting adoption as a way to formalize intimate adult
relationships).
In Robert Paul P., New York's highest court rejected adoption as a mechanism to
formalize what the court characterized as a nonfilial relationship. Id. The decision
focused on traditional parent-child roles, not on the resulting family status. Id. According to the court, "where the relationship between the adult parties is utterly incompatible with the creation of a parent-child relationship between them, the
adoption process is certainly not the proper vehicle by which to formalize their partnership in the eyes of the law." Id. The court asserted that it should be the legislature's decision as to whether unmarried sexual partners should be able to adopt one
another for the purpose of legalizing their relationship. Id.
In Mann, however, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division circumvented the highest court's ruling. Mann, 121 A.D.2d at 292. In Mann, the plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment that the defendant's apartment was exempt from rent
control following the death of the defendant's co-tenant. Id. at 289. The defendant
was living with the co-tenant when the apartment became rent-controlled and continued to live there "as a nonpurchasing rent-controlled tenant." Id. at 290. The defendant argued that because she had been adopted by the co-tenant, she was entitled to
succeed in the tenancy under New York law. Id. (citing New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations § 56(d)). Relying on the established rule that adults may be adopted
for inheritance purposes, the Mann court held that adult adoptions are permitted
where economic concerns are a primary motivation for the adoption. Id.. The court
reasoned, therefore, that the underlying personal motivations such as protecting
one's rights in a shared apartment were acceptable purposes for adoption. Id.
Similarly, the decision in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co. indicates a retreat from the
reasoning set forth in Robert Paul P. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53
(N.Y. 1989). In Braschi, New York's highest court asserted that adoption is improper
only where "none of the incidents of a filial relationship is evidenced or even remotely intended .... " Id. Moreover, the court held that a same-sex couple can form
a family within the meaning of rent control laws. Id. at 54-55.
49 See Zimmer, supra note 42, at 691. Zimmer asserted that further legal tools were
needed to define the rights given to individuals of adult adoption. Id.
50 ACHTENBERG & GILcmus-r, supra note 42, at § 1.05(2) (a). Adoption merely
removes standing to contest the will from the testator's blood relatives. Id.; see also Sol
Lovas, When Is A Family Not A Family? InheritanceAnd The Taxation Of InheritanceWithin
The Non-TraditionalFamily, 24 IAHo L. REv. 353, 354-67 (1988) (surveying inheritance
problems within the non-traditional family). Because inheritance laws regarding
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employment benefits because most benefits are available only to
the worker's minor children.5 Most significantly, adult adoption is
5 2
an inadequate marriage alternative because of its irrevocability.
Without a viable and clearcut dissolution device similar to divorce,
53
courts may be even more reluctant to endorse adult adoption.
B.

Domestic Partnership

Domestic partnership is a legal status conferred upon nontraditional couples by municipal governments as an alternative to
marriage. 54 This alternative primarily provides the private sector
with a means to extend employment benefits to same-sex couples.5 5
adult adoption differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the law's effectiveness will vary.
Id. at 373. The prevailing view, however, is that same-sex couples have no inheritance
rights without beneficiary designation or a valid will. Id. at 393-94.
51 AcHrENBERG & GncHnusr, supra note 42, at § 1.05(2) (e).
2
52 Id. at § 1.05(4). But see CAL. CVIL CODE § 27(p) (6) (West 1992) (allowing an
adopted adult to file a petition for termination of the adoptive relationship after written notification is provided to the adoptive parent).
53 Zimmer, supra note 42, at 692. Furthermore, couples separating after adoption
face a precarious legal position due to the lack of a specific property designation
scheme. Id. Courts, therefore, could only deal with designation of property rights if
they are provided with prearranged individualized contracts. Id.
54 Wilson, supra note 15, at 539 & n.2. Domestic partnership has been generally
defined as two people who are committed to each other and have decided to share
their lives in an intimate familial relationship. Jean Seligmann, Variations on a Theme,
The Twenty First Century Family, NEwswEE , Winter/Spring 1990, at 38. Partners must
register with their municipality, a process that usually entails filing an affidavit declaring the creation of the partnership and paying a nominal fee. Treuthart, supra note 5,
at 101-02.
In 1907, Denmark was the first country worldwide to establish partnership registration for same-sex couples. Marianne H. Pedersen, Denmark: Homosexual Marriages
And New Rules Regarding Separation And Divorce, 30 U. Louisvnui J. F~ss. L. 289, 289
(1991). Denmark's legislation differs from other laws in that Denmark extends legal
benefits that more closely parallel marriage. Id. at 290. Registered partners, however,
still cannot jointly adopt children or obtain custody of a child. Id.; see also Michael L.
Closen & Carol R. Heise, HIVAIDS and the Non-TraditionalFamily: The Argument for
State and FederalJudicialRecognition of Danish Same-Sex Marriages, 16 NOVA L. REv. 809,
815-16, 824-45 (1992) (arguing for United States courts to follow Denmark's recognition of same-sex marriages because such recognition would serve the best health interests of United States citizens).
United States municipalities that have enacted domestic partnership ordinances
include Los Angeles, Berkeley, West Hollywood, and Laguna Beach, California; New
York City and Ithaca, New York; Seattle, Washington; Madison, Wisconsin; and
Takoma Park, Maryland. Wilson, supra note 15, at 539 n.2.
55 Id. at 540; see also Zimmer, supra note 42, at 692 (describing domestic partnership legislation as an employer response to the demands of unmarried employees).
Cities that have extended domestic partnership benefit ordinances to city employees
and their partners include:
Seattle, WA (March 1990-health benefits, August 1989-sick leave/bereavement leave); Takoma Park, MD (November 1988-sick leave/be-
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Although domestic partnership is a commendable step towards recognizing the needs of same-sex couples,56 it is still an ineffective alternative for combatting the unequal treatment afforded
to married heterosexual couples and committed homosexual
couples." Specifically, domestic partnership does not grant partners the legal benefits of marriage.58 Unlike marriage partners,
most prospective domestic partners are required to live together
for a period of time prior to the acquisition of domestic partnership status.59 Moreover, while a heterosexual couple has the option
of choosing between marriage and domestic partnership, the samesex couple does not even have marriage and its accompanying benefits as an option.6 Thus, the pivotal issue is equal choice.61
reavement leave); Madison, WI (August 1988-sick leave/bereavement
leave); Los Angeles, CA (March 1988-sick leave/bereavement leave);
Santa Cruz, CA (May 1986-sick leave/bereavement leave and health
benefits); West Hollywood, CA (February 1985-parenting leave/sick
leave/bereavement leave, August 1988-dental and vision benefits, December 1988-medical coverage through self-insurance mechanism).
Treuthart, supra note 5, at 102 n.32. Recently, a New York City hospital, Montefiore
Medical Center, decided to provide health benefits to homosexual employees and
their partners if the employee could prove his or her living arrangements resembled
that of married couples. James Barron, Bronx Hospital Gives Gay Couples Spouse Benefits,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at Al, col. 2. Unlike marriage, domestic partnership does
not provide tax benefits, inheritance rights, dissolution procedures, or constitutional
protection. Zimmer, supranote 42, at 694. Significantly, state legislatures do not recognize domestic partnership benefits. Id. It is left to employers' discretion as to
whether they choose to provide their employees with equal benefits under an enacted
domestic partnership ordinance. Id.
56 Arguably, entitlements conferred through domestic partnership show that homosexual unions are becoming more accepted in society. Closen & Hiese, supranote
54, at 841.
57 Zimmer, supra note 42, at 693-94. Zimmer pointed out the lack of uniformity in
protecting domestic partnership offers as compared to the established framework of
protection marriage conveys. Id.; see also Raoul Felder, No Cheers for Domestic Partnerships, N.Y. PosT, Apr. 26, 1993, at 21 (describing domestic partnership as a "cruel
hoax" because it offers homosexuals little substantive protection and further ostracizes them from the heterosexual population).
58 Wilson, supra note 15, at 540. Domestic partnership is a limited victory because
it is not universally available, and provides only limited protection in the areas in
which it is available. Cox, supra note 11, at 64. In addition, it is susceptible to voter
repeal efforts. Id.
59 Zimmer, supra note 42, at 693. For example, in Berkeley, California, couples
must live together for six months before they qualify for registration. Milt
Freudenheim, Rising Worry on 'Partner'Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1989, at D5. Similarly, New York City workers are extended benefits only if they register their relationship, cohabitate for at least one year, and maintain a "close and committed"
relationship. Walter Isaacson, Should Gays Have MarriageRights?, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989,
at 101-02.
60 See Zimmer, supra note 42, at 694 (declaring that "[l]imited regulation of this
sort is simply not enough").
61 Id.
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Contract

Same-sex couples have also used the contract as a vehicle to
obtain certain entitlements automatically granted to married
couples, such as property distribution after separation or death.6 2
In the landmark decision Marvin v. Marvin,6" the California
Supreme Court provided unmarried cohabitants with the right to
agree contractually on their chosen form of property distribution.'
Although Marvin involved a heterosexual couple, the
court's neutral treatment of cohabitation can be read broadly to
include same-sex couples. 65
One advantage of the contract alternative is that properly executed contracts conforming to state law requirements provide
same-sex cohabitators with property rights.6 6 Moreover, carefully
drafted documents can furnish the parties with rights in the event
of dissolution.6 7
A major disadvantage to the contract alternative is that samesex couples cannot refer to their sexual relationship in the document. 68 Unfortunately, some courts have found a sexual relation62 Kristin Bullock, Comment, Applying Marvin v. Marvin to Same-Sex Couples: A Proposalfor a Sex-Preference Neutral Cohabitation ContractStatute, 25 U.C. DAvIs L. Rxv. 1029,
1030-31 (1992). Bullock concluded that codification of contract principles with regard to cohabitation contracts would best meet the needs of homosexual couples who
wish to establish property rights. Id. at 1054.
Some members of the homosexual community view automatic property rights as
one of the primary reasons to fight for legal recognition of same-sex marriage. See
CuRRv & CLIFFORD, supranote 26, at 2:2 (observing that courts have begun to uphold
property agreements between homosexual couples). Without the right to marry, a
contract is essentially the only way to provide judicial redress to the separating samesex couple because their relationship is not legally recognized. Zimmer, supra note
42, at 695. Dissolution of marriage, of course, provides property designation guidelines, i.e., whether the jurisdiction subscribes to equitable distribution or community
property theories. Id.
63 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
64 Id. at 116. The court qualified this right, however, by precluding the use of
sexual services as consideration for such a contract. Id.
65 See Bullock, supra note 62, at 1044 (positing that the court's neutral language
applies equally to all adult cohabitants who wish to provide for property distribution
through the use of a contract). The Marvin court refused to impose an outdated
moral standard on the couple. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122. The Marvin court recognized
that "adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights." Id. at 116.
66 See Zimmer, supra note 42, at 696 (noting that AIDS has increased the need for
an effective legal tool for estate planning purposes).
67 Id. Zimmer opined that the contract provides the only alternative for the separating same-sex couple because both equitable distribution and community property
designations are available only to couples who were legally married. Id. at 695-96.
68 Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation In The Mid-Eighties-PartII, 11
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ship to comprise part of the consideration, and have used this
bond as a basis to refuse enforcement of the contract.69 Other jurisdictions permit severance of the sexual service promises from
the contract and enforce the remaining legal promises.7" Perhaps
the largest drawback to this alternative is that it does not create a
legally recognized status for same-sex couples. 1
D.

Why These Alternatives Fail

Although same-sex couples can and have used adult adoption,
domestic partnership, and contracts to receive certain benefits,
these options fail as adequate alternatives. 72 In particular, these alternatives fail to resolve the inherent unfairness resulting from the
fact that while a plethora of economic and emotional benefits are
automatically conferred upon married couples, same-sex couples
are forced to fight for a fraction of these rights. 73 In other words,
none provide same-sex couples with an alternative that parallels
marriage. Clearly, the only remedy to the problem is recognition
marriage or establishment of a nontraditional
of same-sex
74
equivalent.
III.

MARRIAGE AND THE COURTS

While the Supreme Court has proclaimed that the freedom to
marry is among a person's basic civil rights, 75 state courts have not
U. DAYrON L. REv. 275, 375 (1986) (citing Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1981)).
Denying the sexual aspect of the same-sex couple's relationship, however, essentially
delegitimizes it. Zimmer, supra note 42, at 697.
69 AcHTENBERG & GILCHRIST, supra note 42, at § 2.04(1]. States which unequivo-

cally find that a sexual relationship invalidates a contract are Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Georgia, and Tennessee. Id.
70 Id. For instance, the Marvin court recognized the applicability of this contract
principle to cohabitation agreements. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 114. Specifically, the court

refused to render cohabitation contracts invalid if they involved sexual relationships.
Id. at 114-15. The court determined that to do so would result in an unworkable
standard because cohabitating couples are usually sexually involved. Id. at 114.
71 Zimmer, supra note 42, at 697.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 688, 697 (stressing that the alternatives not only result in
nonuniformity with regards to the definition of the same-sex couple but also fail to
define adequately the rights and responsibilities of the partners).
74 See id. at 697 ("Only through marriage can same-sex couples achieve the psychological harmony of emotional commitment coupled with legal protection.") Even legalization of same-sex marriage, however, will not resolve all the problems of
alternative families at least with regard to parenthood issues. Cox, supra note 11, at
65. For example, the law offers limited protection to stepparents, which would affect
homosexual couples who chose to marry if same-sex marriage was permitted. Id. at
65-66.
75 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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endorsed this philosophy with regard to same-sex marriage. 76 Instead, state courts have restrictively defined marriage as an opposite-sex union, and have been reluctant to stray from this
definition."
The issue of whether same-sex couples have the right to marry
remained unaddressed until 1971,78 when the Minnesota Supreme
Court decided Baker v. Nelson. 9 In Baker, two men challenged, on
statutory and constitutional grounds, Minnesota's refusal to issue
them a marriage license.8 0 The court quickly dismissed the statu76 See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1188, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding the state's refusal to issue a marriage license to two men); Jones v. Hallahan,
501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. CL App. 1973) (upholding the denial of a marriage license
to a same-sex couple); Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.RLD. 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (dismissing
action by two females seeking an order to compel the county clerk to issue application
for marriage license); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (upholding a state statute denying a marriage license to
two men); see alsoAdams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1111 (1982) (refusing to recognize a same-sex marriage for federal immigration law purposes).
Singer,Jones, and Bakerall emphasize that marriage is a same-sex union by definition. Schwarzschild, supra note 4, at 113 & nn.117-18. Underlying each decision's
reliance on dictionary and encyclopedia definitions is basically an "is and always has
been" rationale. Id. at 113. This rationale originated in Anonymous v. Anonymous. Id.
& n.113; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Special Term 1971). The
Anonymous court quashed a marriage involving a transsexual, reasoning that the requisite partners to a marriage are a man and a woman. Id. at 499, 501. The court asserted that" [m]arriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman."
Id. at 500 (emphasis added); see also In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob.
1987) (invalidating a marriage between a male and a postoperative transsexual female). But cf. M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (NJ. App. Div. 1976) (holding that a
valid marriage can occur between a male and a male-to-female postoperative
transsexual).
The first battles for legal recognition of same-sex marriage paralleled the growth
of the lesbian and gay rights movement in the 1970s. Friedman, supranote 12, at 137.
Alissa Friedman maintains that "[t] he early same-sex marriage cases are better viewed
as political efforts to raise the consciousness of the American public than as realistic
efforts to effect social change through litigation." Id.
The battle for homosexual rights in the United States can be traced back to the
1920s. DAvm F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTMUCrION OF HOMOSEXUALriy 458 (The University of Chicago Press 1988). The 1968 Stonewall riot, in which patrons of a New
York City gay bar fought against police who had raided the bar, commenced the modem homosexual rights movement. Id. For a detailed account of the modem gay
movement, see id. at 455-81.
77 Schwarzschild, supra note 4, at 113. Only a few jurisdictions have expressly declared that marriage is restricted to a man and a woman. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04
(West 1986) (mandating that no marriage license shall be issued "unless one party is a
male and the other party is a female"); MD. FA LAw CODE ANN. § 2-201 (1991)
("Only a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this state.").
78 Schwarzchild, supra note 4, at 113-14.
79 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.), appeal dismissed 409 U.S. 810 (1971).
80 Id. at 185-86. Baker and McConnell based their claim on the lack of an express
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tory claim, defining marriage as a "union between persons of the
opposite sex."81 In so holding, the court noted the state's strong
interest in encouraging procreation.82
The Baker court also rejected the couple's equal protection
and due process claims.8 3 The court reasoned that the unconstitutionality of anti-miscegenation statutes was not parallel to prohibitions against same-sex marriage."' According to the court, antimiscegenation statutes were precluded solely because they are raprohibition of homosexual marriage in the Minnesota statutes. Id. at 185. The
couple contended that the right to marry is a fundamental right, irrespective of the
gender of either party, and that refusing to recognize same-sex marriage is irrational
and invidiously discriminatory. Id. at 186.
81 Id. at 185-86. The court cited two dictionaries to support its interpretation of
the statute. Id. at 186 n.1 (quoting WEBsrER's TmilD NEw INTEr-AIONAL DiarnoNARY
1384 (1966); BLAcK's LAw DicnoNARY 1123 (4th ed. 1957)). The court first referenced Webster's Third New International Dictionary, which defined marriage as "the
state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as husband or wife." Id. (quoting
WEBsTER's THImD NEw INTERNATIONAL DicnoNaRY 1384 (1966)). Similarly, the court
looked to Black's Law Dictionary that defined marriage as "the civil status ...of one
man and one woman united in law for life ... ." Id. (quoting BLAcK's LAw DianoNARx
1123 (4th ed. 1957)).
82 Id. at 186. The court glibly distinguished the privacy right upheld in Griswold v.
Connecticut stressing that the privacy right existed because the state had authorized
the marriage. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)). At issue in Griswoldwas a state statute making it a criminal act for any person
to use contraceptives. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. In Griswold, defendant-appellants, the
director and medical director of the local Planned Parenthood, were convicted of
giving married persons advice regarding the use of contraceptives. Id. In striking the
statute, the Court found that several of the Bill of Rights guarantee to protect a "zone
of privacy". Id. at 482-85. The Court concluded that the right of married persons to
use contraceptives fall within this zone. Id. at 485. The Court was particularly persuaded by the privacy implications of proof in prosecutions, admonishing that "[tJhe
very idea [of allowing police to search the marital bedroom for signs of contraceptive
use was] repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."
Id. at 485-86. Thus, Griswold is considered a landmark case for recognizing the right
of privacy-a new constitutional right. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIo N.U. L. Rzv. 511, 512 (1989) (analyzing the constitutional, doctrinal,
and perceptional ramifications of Griswold after twenty-five years); G. Sidney
Buchanan, The Right of Privacy:Past,Present, and Future, 16 OHIo N.U. L. Rzv. 403, 404
(1989) [hereinafter Buchanan, The Right of Privacy] (examining the Griswold precedent
and the extension of the right to privacy in the twenty-five years since Griswold).
83 Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186, 187. Specifically the couple argued that opposite-sex
couples who were unwilling or unable to procreate were not similarly denied the right
to marry. Id. at 187. The Bakercourt rejected the equal protection claim, however, on
the grounds that a state's classification of persons permitted to marry was constitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment did not demand "abstract symmetry." Id.
(footnote omitted).
84 Id. The court discussed Loving v. Virginia, in which a state statute prohibited
interracial marriages. Id. at 187 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967)).
Holding that this racial classification violated equal protection, the Loving Court rejected the state's contention that the statute did not invidiously discriminate because
it punished both white and black participants equally. Loving 388 U.S. at 8, 11.
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cially discriminatory.8" The majority insisted that a clear distinction existed between a marital restriction based on race and one
86
based on sex.
Shortly after Baker, this view of marriage, as limited to a man
and woman, was followed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, then
8 7 In rejecting the
the state's highest court, in Jones v. Hallahan.
claims of two women seeking a marriage license, 8 the court applied a more restrictive definition of marriage than the Baker
court.8 9 After quoting extensively from dictionaries and an encyclopedia,"° the Jones court concluded simply that marriage has traditionally been viewed as an opposite-sex union. 9 1' The court failed
to address the couple's constitutional claims, 92 because it had already determined that the couple's proposed union was not a
marriage. 3
In Singer v. Hara,94 the Washington Court of Appeals did not
stray from the pattern set by Baker and Jones.95 The court promulgated that a marital union presumably consisted only of a man and
a woman. 9 6 As in Jones, the court ignored federal and state constiBaker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
Id. The court, however, did not elaborate further as to why there is such a "clear
distinction." See id. Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal "for want of a substantial federal question." Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810
(1972). This failure to address such a question is perhaps indicative of deference
accorded to the states with regard to marriage laws. See supra note 3 (discussing regulation of marriage by the states).
87 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
88 Id. at 589.
89 See id. at 589-90 (stating that marriage has always been viewed as an opposite-sex
union and that no constitutional concerns applied). See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Jones court's rejection of same-sex marriage).
90 Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589. Specifically, the court cited Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition which defined marriage as "being united to a person or persons of the opposite sex .... " Id. (citation omitted). The court then cited
Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia, which defined marriage as "[t] he legal union of
a man with a woman for life." Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the court cited to
Black's Law Dictionary which defined marriage as "[tihe civil status... of one man
and one woman united in law for life." Id. (quoting BLAcK's LAw DiCrioNARY 1123
(4th ed. 1957)).
85
86

91 Id.
92 Id. at 590 (maintaining that "[w]e find no constitutional sanction or protection
of the right of marriage between persons of the same sex").
93 Id. Indeed, the court blamed the couple's failure to obtain a license on their
own incapability to enter into a marriage as it was defined. Id. at 589.
94 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
95 See id. at 1191. See supra notes 79-93 (analyzing Baker and Jones).
96 Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191. The court added that it was not necessary to resort to
dictionary definitions to support this presumption. Id. at 1191 n.6. The court contended that an opposite-sex requirement is justified based on the "unique physical
characteristics" of men and women. Id. at 1195. The court reasoned that a primary
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97
tutional claims in reviewing the legality of a same-sex marriage.
In Adams v. Howerton,9 8 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether a same-sex marriage was valid
for purposes of obtaining United States citizenship.9 9 The court
held that Congress could not have intended that same-sex marriage would satisfy immigration law requirements.'O The court further found no constitutional infirmity in the preferential treatment
of heterosexual marriages. 1 1

purpose of marriage is procreation; therefore, the state is justified in prohibiting
same-sex marriage because those unions do not result in offspring. Id. The court
apparently was not aware that same-sex couples are bearing their own children, albeit
with the help of technology. See Friedman, supra note 12, at 158-59 (noting that samesex couples do have families through artificial insemination and sperm bank services).
97 Singer, 522 P.2d at 1197. The plaintiffs, Singer and Barwick, made a simple, yet
compelling argument under the Washington Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).
Friedman, supra note 12, at 140. The Washington ERA required that equal rights not
be infringed upon or denied on account of sex. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1190. The couple
argued that "to permit a man to marry a woman but at the same time to deny him the
right to marry another man is to construct an unconstitutional classification 'on account of sex' ". Id. The court, however, rejected this argument on the grounds that
the voters did not intend to extend same-sex couples the right to marry when ratifying
the ERA. Id. at 1193-94. The court assumed that the voters only intended to remedy
discrimination "between women and men on account of sex." Id. at 1194.
In addition, Singer and Barwick contended that the opposite-sex requirement for
marriage constituted a classification based upon sex that was "inherently suspect,"
therefore triggering strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 1195 (citation omitted). The court
conceded that Washington's highest court had held that a sex-based classification was
inherently suspect. Id. at 1196 (citation omitted). The court dismissed this claim,
however, on the grounds than in its ERA analysis it had already determined that
"[a] ppellants were not denied a marriage license because of their sex; rather they were
denied a marriage license because of the nature of marriage itself." Id.
98 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). Adams, an American
male citizen, and Sullivan, an Australian male citizen, obtained a marriage license in
Boulder, Colorado, and went through a marriage ceremony. Id. at 1038; Adams v.
Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1980). Adams then petitioned the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to reclassify Sullivan as an immediate relative.
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038.
99 Id. at 1040. Presumably, Sullivan wanted to obtain an immigrant visa to avoid
deportation. Friedman, supra note 12, at 142.
Initially, the district court addressed whether the marriage was valid under Colorado law. Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1122. In so doing, the court deferred to the definition of marriage in Black's Law Dictionary and the reasoning of Singer to find that a
same-sex union cannot be a valid marriage. Id. at 1122-23.
100 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1041.
101 Id. at 1042. Relying on the deference traditionally accorded to Congress's judgment regarding immigration, the court observed on the constitutional issues that "in
this area of the law, Congress has almost plenary power and may enact statutes which,
if applied to citizens, would be constitutional." Id. The court decided, therefore, that
the opposite sex requirement for purposes of immigration laws need only pass rational basis scrutiny. Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress rationally decided
that "preferential status is not warranted for the spouses of homosexual marriages[ ]
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In 1991, the legitimacy of homosexual marriage was addressed
Essentially following from
again in Dean v. District of Columbia.'
the reasoning set forth in earlier cases, the Dean court denied the
plaintiffs a marriage license on the grounds that the relationship
did not fit within the traditional definition of marriage.' 0 3 The
court posited that certain provisions of the law indicated the legislature's recognition that procreation was an integral part of marriage. ° 4 The Dean court explained that the plaintiffs were not
because homosexual marriages never produce offspring, because they are not
recognized in most, if in any, of the states, or because they violate traditional and
often prevailing societal mores." Id. at 1042-43.
102 No. 90-13892 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991). Craig Dean and Patrick Gill, the
plaintiffs, filed this suit after the clerk of the District of Columbia refused to issue
them a marriage license. Id. at 1.
103 Id. at 26 (quoting Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1196 (Wash. CL App. 1974)).
Upon concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. The court first considered
whether the legislature intended to authorize same-sex marriage when it enacted the
Marriage and Divorce Act in 1977. Id. at 1. The plaintiffs contended that the District
of Columbia was required to issue them a marriage license under the "gender-neutral" language of the Marriage and Divorce Act. Id. After examining the local ordinance regulating marriage, the court concluded that the gender-specific language of
the law did not permit same-sex marriage. Id. at 7-9. The court considered not only
the wording of the Act, but also the "gender distinctive" provisions in the history of
the District of Columbia's marriage provisions. Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted). Specifically, the court pointed to D.C. CODE § 30-318 that read "husband and wife shall be
competent witnesses...", and D.C. CODE, § 30-201, which read, in relevant part: "This
section (relating to property rights) shall not be ... deemed to affect the law relating
to... ownership of property held by the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties
.. " Id. at 9. The court was especially persuaded by the annulment provision of D.C.
LAw 1-107, which read, in relevant part: "Marriage contracts may be annulled ...
where either party was matrimonially incapacitated at the time of the marriage and
has continued to be so incapacitated. .. ." Id. at 11-12. The Dean court noted that
this bigamy provision was relevant only when an individual married another while
"having a husband or wife from a prior, undissolved marriage." Id. at 12.
Moreover, the court interpreted matrimonial incapacity to mean an inability to
consummate the marriage through sexual intercourse. Id. The court maintained
that oral sex and anal sex could not have been the types of intercourse contemplated
by the legislature, based on the fact that both oral and anal sex constitute criminal
sodomy violations. Id. at 13. The court reasoned that without participating in sodomy, it is questionable whether a same-sex marriage could ever be "consummated."
Id.
According to the commonly understood meaning of the words, the court further
reasoned that construction of the statute required a finding that marriage is defined
as a union between a man and a woman. Id. at 13-14 (quotation omitted). Again, the
court relied on common definitions of marriage. Id. at 14 (citations omitted). The
court concluded its definitional analysis of the historical meaning of marriage with a
list of Biblical scriptures containing references to a man and his wife. Id. at 18-20
(quoting Genesis 2:18, 22-25; Deuteronomy 24:1-5; Matthew 19:3-6; Ephesians5:22, 25, 33).
104 Id. at 10. As evidence, the court specifically pointed to the District of Columbia's consanguinity prohibitions. Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted). These prohibitions,
the court maintained, indicated the legislative recognition that the encouragement of
...
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denied a marriage license because of their "sexual orientation,"
but rather because the "nature of marriage itself" requires the participating parties to be of the opposite sex." 5
Most recently, Hawaii's highest court took the first step to? 0 6 Although
wards legalizing same-sex marriage in Baehr v. Lewin.
refusing to declare same-sex marriage a fundamental constitutional
right, 10 7 the Baehr court held that barring such marriages might
violate the Hawaii Constitution's prohibition against sex discrimination.0 8 Remanding the case, the Baehr court articulated that the
state had to prove that the present statutory prohibitions against
same-sex marriage furthered a compelling state interest and were
narrowly tailored for minimal infringement of constitutional
09
rights.'
The common thread running throughout the cases which reprocreation is one of the purposes of marriage. Id. at 10. In line with Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), and Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974), the court emphasized the procreational aspect of marriage. Id. at 11. The court also addressed the argument that heterosexual
couples unwilling or unable to procreate should similarly be denied marriage
licenses, but quickly and superficially dismissed it on the grounds that procreation is
essential to the survival of the human race. Id.
105 Id. at 25-26 (quoting Singer, 522 P.2d at 1196). The court determined that any
change in the definition should come from the legislature rather than the court. Id.
at 26.
106 No. 15689, 1993 Haw. LEXIS 26, at *12, *33 (May 5, 1993). Three homosexual
couples, who asserted that prohibitions on homosexual marriage violated their rights
of privacy and equal protection, filed a suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
Id. at *14-15, *22-23.
107 Id. at *41-42.
108 Id. at *79. The court first pointed out that the Hawaii Constitution provided
broader protection than the United States Constitution. Id. at *51 (citation omitted).
Specifically, the Hawaii Constitution provides in relevant part that "no person shall
...
be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the
person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of
race, religion, sex, or ancestry." Id. (quoting HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5). Conversely, the
United States Constitution simply forbade the denial of equal protection. Id. (quot-

ing U.S.

CONST.

amend XIV).

The court then declared sex as a "suspect category" for equal protection purposes under Hawaii's constitution, and that classifications based on sex would be presumed unconstitutional. Id. at *79. Accordingly, the court held that any such
classifications could stand only if they passed "strict scrutiny" analysis by showing that
the classification was based upon a compelling state interest, and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Id.
109 Id. at *83-84 (citations omitted). Gay advocates are viewing this decision as a
major breakthrough because it is the first case to consider seriously homosexual marriage. Jeffrey Schmalz, In Hawaii, Step Toward Legalized Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMEs, May
7, 1993, at A14 (hereinafter Schmalz, In Hawaii]. If upon remand, Hawaii decides to
legalize gay marriage, the decision would have nationwide ramifications because all
states recognize marriages performed in other states. Id.
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fuse to legalize same-sex marriage is that marriage, by definition, is
restricted to opposite-sex couples." 0 Each decision has relied
upon the traditional conception of marriage and family, supported
by the common dictionary definition."1 The states' consistent reliance upon the traditional definition of marriage is misplaced because
a definition, as part of the substantive law that incorporates
it,1 12 is subject to constitutional scrutiny'and revision. 113
Reliance upon this standard definition has led to the disparate
treatment of homosexual couples. 1 4 The more a particular inequality infringes upon an important relationship, such as marriage,
the greater the necessity for the courts to examine the relevant
laws, and invalidate those that are unconstitutional or no longer
serve their intended purpose.' 1 5 The judiciary must expand and
redefine the concept of marriage 1 6 in accordance with its fundamental values and function." 7 Overall, the case law governing
110 See Schwarzschild, supra note 4, at 117 (pointing out that the cases which refuse
to recognize same-sex marriage "share a common logic as well as a common blind
spot" in that the decisions were based upon common dictionary definitions). While
the cases discussed here have all dealt with statutory marriage, the issue of common
law same-sex marriage has not gone unaddressed. See De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d
952, 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (refusing to recognize a same-sex common law marriage based on Pennsylvania's statutory prohibitions against same-sex marriage).
111 Schwarzschild, supra note 4, at 117.
112 Friedman, supra note 12, at 151. This reasoning is unsound because nonlegal
definitions change as the nature of the thing they are defining changes-definitions
are notjust changed by legislatures. Strasser, supra note 16, at 987. Furthermore, the
definition of marriage is no longer confined to the union of a man and a woman. Id.
Marriage is commonly found in daily conversation, newspapers, magazines, and journals and often refers to same-sex unions, even if the reference is not to a legal marriage. Id.
113 Friedman, supra note 12, at 151; see also Strasser, supra note 16, at 986 (calling
for courts and theorists to recognize that definitions either incorporated or created
by statutes are subject to constitutional limitations).
114 See Lookingfor a Family Resemblance, supra note 14, at 1640 (recognizing that alternative families are often refused the significant benefits automatically bestowed upon
legally recognized families). For a list of the benefits conferred upon legally married
couples, see supra note 20.
115 Lewis, supra note 17, at 1797.
116 See Closen & Heise, supra note 54, at 823 (arguing that as society becomes more
accepting of homosexuality and of the severity of the AIDS epidemic, adjudication
must begin to recognize same-sex marriage as a result of the changing times); Lewis,
supra note 17, at 1797-98 (calling for the Court to redefine rights as the need arises).
117 Id. One commentator has posited that Puritan ideology, as one of the fundamental roots of American law, argues strongly for legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Penas, supra note 13, at 537-38. Puritan ideology is based on a divine-human
covenant under which God promised to protect the human race, while humans were
expected to care for one another. Id. at 54142. According to covenant theology,
human life is basically communal. Id. at 543. It should not be surprising, then, that
Puritans stressed the partnershipof marriage as: "mutual help, affection, and respect."

COMMENT

1993]

369

marriage is grounded upon historic and outdated notions.'
IV.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' 19 is used to invalidate legislation that infringes upon certain
Id. at 544. Additionally, Puritan covenant relationships emphasized a person's freedom to choose whom to marry. Id.
But cf. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 14, at 1641, 1652-59 (exposing
limitations of the functional approach, which legitimizes non-nuclear relationships,
and proposing open registration systems for individuals in alternative relationships to
formalize their relationships).
118 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 3, at 55 (noting that modern prohibitions against
same-sex marriage "rely heavily on ancient dogma and religious teachings"). For instance, in Baker v. Nelson, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned:
The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely
involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as
old as the book of Genesis ....

This historic institution manifestly is

more deeply founded than the asserted contemporary concept of marriage and societal interests for which petitioners contend.
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972) (citation omitted).
As one commentator pointed out, the Baker court's reliance upon "commonsense," and marriage as an "historic institution ... deeply founded," is strange in light
of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down a statute based on equally
"deeply founded" principles. Schwarzschild, supra note 4, at 114-15 (citations omitted). See generally Strasser, supranote 16, at 981 (maintaining that the states' refusal to
recognize same-sex marriage closely parallels the states' former refusal to permit interracial marriage in that such refusal deprives homosexuals of a fundamental right).
119 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The right to equal protection is a deeply rooted concept in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protectionof
the Laws-A HistoricalInquiry, 22 SAN DIEcGo L. REv. 499, 507 (1985). Equal protection
is based on the notion of quid pro quo, in which the citizen gives allegiance to the
sovereign in exchange for its protection. Id. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment governs state and local government classifications. JoHN E.
NowAu & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsT-TUloNAL LAw § 14.1, at 568-69 (4th ed. 1991).

The Equal Protection Clause, therefore, regulates governmental classifications that
afford different benefits and burdens to individuals under the law, and theoretically
guarantees that all persons will be treated similarly. Id. at 568. Equal protection analysis determines whether a particular classification is properly drawn. Id. at § 14.2, at
570. If a federal government classification contravenes the equal protection guarantee, a due process violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs. Id. at § 14.1, at 569.
Because the exact nature and scope of the rights guaranteed by the clause are
unclear, however, it is questionable whether equal protection guarantees actually exist. Melanie E. Meyers, Note, Impermissible Purposes And The Equal Protection Clause, 86
COL. L. Rzv. 1184, 1184 (1986). Meyers noted that the Supreme Court's equal protection decisions had been described as "incoherent, 'rudderless,' unprincipled, and
ultimately 'astonishing.' " Id. at 1184 (citations omitted). As an alternative approach,
Meyers argued for an impermissible purpose analysis of governmental classifications
as a way of achieving more consistent treatment of the equal protection doctrine. Id.
at 1209; see also Paul M. Bator, Equality As A ConstitutionalValue, 9 HIAv. J.L. & PuB.
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individual rights. 12 ' The Equal Protection Clause prohibits arbitrary classification of all persons similarly situated with respect to a
statute's purpose. 21 Under the Equal Protection Clause, a legislative classification will be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis if a fundamental right or a suspect class is involved.1 22 Strict scrutiny
review imposes a heavy burden of proof upon the state because the
government must establish that the statute is narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling state interest. 23 Thus, strict scrutiny essenPOL'Y 21, 21 (1986) ("[T]he legal commentary... [on the Equal Protection Clause]
seems tedious or incoherent or both.... [T]he many cases on the subject do not in
any systematic or deep way confront the problematical quality of equality as a constitutional value."); Robert A. Destro, Equality, Social Welfare And Equal Protection, 9 HAuv.
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 51, 60 (1986) (maintaining that "the government, [and] especially
the courts, routinely confuse equal protection and social welfare concerns"); William
Kristol, Equal ProtectionDoctrine: FoundationsIn Mud, 9 HA.v. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 35, 39
(1986) (arguing that the current concept of equal protection "is incoherent and unsustainable and needs to be rethought").
120 Wilson, supra note 15, at 548-49.
121 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (citing Royster v. Guano Co., 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920)). In other words, equal protection guarantees are triggered when a law
classifies groups of individuals for different burdens or benefits. NowAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 119, at § 14.2, at 571.
One possible equal protection argument is that men are denied equal protection
of the laws when they are not allowed to marry men, and similarly that women are
denied the same protection when they are not allowed to marry women. Friedman,
supra note 12, at 145. In Bakerv. Nelson, the plaintiffs made this argument by analogizing their case to Loving v. Virginia, in which the Court held that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute violated equal protection, even though the right to marry a person of
a different race was denied equally to blacks and whites. Id. at 144-45 (citing Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967)).
Specifically, the Baker plaintiffs argued that the marital opposite-sex requirement is
irrational and invidiously discriminatory on the basis of sex. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
The Bakercourt declared, however, that "there is a clear distinction between a marital
restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference
in sex." Id. at 187. For a discussion of Baker v. Nelson, see supra notes 79-86 and
accompanying text.
This analogy to Loving seems more persuasive today in light of the developments
in the law over the past two decades. Friedman, supra note 12, at 145. Specifically,
the Supreme Court now employs a new approach to classifications based on sex. Id.;
see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (articulating that "classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives"). The opposite sex marriage requirement
classifies according to sex in the same fashion that the anti-miscegenation statutes
classified according to race. Friedman, supra note 12, at 145. That same-sex marriage
is denied equally to males and females does not immunize the restriction from constitutional attack. Id.
122 Comment, Homosexual's Right To Marry: A ConstitutionalTest And A Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. Rxv. 193, 199-200 (1979) [hereinafter Homosexual's Right to Marry].
123 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 376 (1971) (holding that
states cannot deny welfare benefits to aliens because states' fiscal interests in preserving limited resources for its citizens is not compelling); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 622, 629-31, 638 (1969) (invalidating the denial of welfare benefits to resi-
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tially presumes the unconstitutionality of a challenged
classification.124
Although the Equal Protection Clause, on its face, would appear to be a useful weapon to fight marital discrimination against
homosexual couples, the opposite is true.125 The right to marry
126 and
has been declared fundamental only towards heterosexuals,
27
class.1
suspect
homosexuals have not been declared a
A.

Are Homosexuals A Suspect Class For Equal Protection Purposes?

The Supreme Court has thus far accorded suspect status to
classifications based upon race, 28 alienage, 29 and national ancesdents who had not resided in the jurisdiction for at least a year on grounds that the
right to travel was fundamental); Loving; 388 U.S. at 11 (stating that distinctions
drawn according to race require strict scrutiny).
124 Homosexual's Right to Maniy, supra note 122, at 200. On the other hand, if
neither a fundamental right or a suspect class is involved, a challenged law will generally be upheld so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id.;
see, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 424, 440-42 (1982) (holding
that a state employment statute requiring a fact-finding conference within 120 days of
filing the complaint was not a rational way of achieving the state objective of expediting disputes); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177-79
(1980) (stating generally that so long as a plausible reason exists for Congress's enactment of the classification scheme for distributing retirement benefits, the equal protection guarantee was satisfied); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 312, 314-16 (1976) (upholding a state statute that required police officers to
retire at age fifty because it was rationally related to the state's goal of ensuring physically fit policemen); Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 222-23, 22425 (1949) (holding that the state's goal of stamping out funeral insurance was legitimate). In practice, application of the rational basis test virtually assures a finding of
constitutionality. Wilson, supra note 15, at 549. This result can be explained, at least
in part, by the deference accorded state legislatures. See, e.g., Danie 336 U.S. at 224
(reminding that the Court will not deem legislation illegitimate simply because the
Court believes that the objective behind state legislation is unwise); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 82 (1911) (invalidating a law only if the classification is purely arbitrary).
125 Lewis, supra note 17, at 1785.
126 See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (declaring that only racial classifications with
regard to marriage are prohibited); Zablocki v. Redhai4 434 U.S. 374, 378-79, 383-84
(examining a statutory scheme as applied to a heterosexual couple).
127 See Homosexual's Right to May, supra note 122, at 202 (stating that the Supreme
Court has declared only race, alienage, and nationality to be suspect classes). If marriage were deemed to be a fundamental right, strict scrutiny would also be triggered.
See infra notes 172, 183, and accompanying text (discussing application of strict scrutiny review to the right to marry).
In Singer v. Hara, a couple unsuccessfully attempted to invoke strict scrutiny in
determining whether a state's marriage laws violated an individual's fundamental
rights. Singer v. Hara, 542 P.2d 1187, 1195-97 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). For an additional discussion of Singer, see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431, 433-34 (1984) (holding invalid a
state court order that transferred custody of a child to the father on grounds that the
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try,130 but not yet to homosexuality.' 3 ' While the Court has not
determined whether this list is exhaustive,13 2 race is the characteristic that most clearly constitutes suspect status.' 33 For other classes
to qualify as suspect, they must resemble to some undefined degree
the suspectness of race.' 3 4 Because the characteristics that constiface a formidable barrier
tute suspectness are limited, homosexuals
35
in gaining suspect status recognition.
child's mother had married a black man, which would result in the child's social stigmatization); Loving 388 U.S. at 11 (reminding that distinctions drawn according to
race demand the "most rigid scrutiny"); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 186,
193, 196 (1964) (invalidating a statute prohibiting blacks from cohabitating with
white members of the opposite sex); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1964)
(invalidating a law requiring a candidate's race to appear on an election ballot);
Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (explicitly rejecting the separate but
equal doctrine in public education); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)
(holding that the federal government could not be permitted to operate racially-segregated schools any more than could the states).
129 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that states
cannot deny welfare benefits to aliens); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 635-36, 640
(1948) (holding that a California law, which forbade aliens from owing agricultural
land, violated the equal protection rights of an American minor citizen of Japanese

heritage).
130 See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (finding that

discrimination against any racial group triggers strict scrutiny, even if the group has
never been the subject of widespread discrimination); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 479-80 (1954) (holding that discrimination against Mexican-Americans would be
scrutinized in the same way that discrimination against blacks would have been because the Mexican-Americans were also a group "distinct from 'whites' "); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16, 219-20 (1944) (upholding internment ofJapanese-Americans under strict scrutiny where such exclusion is necessary for the protection of citizens in times of war).
131 See Homosexual's Right to Marry, supra note 122, at 202 (pointing out that the
Supreme Court has only granted suspect class status to classifications based upon
race, alienage, and national ancestry).
132 See Wilson, supra note 15, at 551 (observing that poverty has been viewed as
suspect, and that the Supreme Court has not precluded additions to the list of suspect

groups).
'33 Note, The Constitutional Status Of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality As A Suspect
Classification,98 HI-xv. L. REv. 1285, 1297-98 (1985) [hereinafter ConstitutionalStatus

Of Sexual Orientation].
'34

Id. at 1298; see also Ellen Chaitin & V. Roy Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect, 8 LINcoIN L.

REv. 24, 37 (1973) (describing race as the "first and foremost suspect class").

135 See Homosexual's Right to Marry, supra note 122, at 203, 206 (positing that homosexuals do not exhibit suspect characteristics to the same extent as established suspect
classes; specifically, "homosexuality is not as visible or as immutable as the characteristics of the traditional suspect classes"). The Supreme Court denied the opportunity
to decide whether a heightened standard of review should be applied to legislative
classifications based upon sexual orientation in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 451-52 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has declared homosexuals a suspect class. Watkins v. United States Army, 817 F.2d 1329,
1349 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
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While no explicit or coherent theory of what constitutes suspectness exists,13 6 homosexuals, as a class, exhibit at least some, if
not all, of the characteristics commonly associated with suspect status.1 7 These characteristics include immutability, derogatory ster-

eotyping, historical discrimination, and political disadvantage.'38
Immutability implies that an individual does not intentionally
possess a given trait, and that the trait could not be easily
changed.13 9 Recent studies suggest that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic determined at birth."4 Were homosexuality
proven to be an immutable trait, gays and lesbians could not be
placed at a disadvantage because it is unfair to impose legal burdens upon-or award legal
benefits to-an individual based upon
41
an immutable attribute.'

14 2

Hostility and prejudice toward homosexuality is widespread,
dating as far back as the thirteenth century. 143 Indeed, in the
United States, derogatory stereotyping of homosexuals is common. 144 Homosexuals have been perceived as being promiscuous,
45
psychologically maladjusted, untrustworthy, and perverted.

Wilson, supra note 15, at 552.
Homosexual's Right to Marry, supra note 122, at 203.
138 Wilson, supra note 15, at 552.
139 ConstitutionalStatus Of Sexual Orientation,supra note 133, at 1302. One commentator has contended that immutability is important because:
[I]t would be pointless to try to deter membership in the immutable
group, or because individual group members cannot be blamed for
their status, or because immutability heightens the sense of stigma associated with membership, since no one would choose to be a member if
she did not have to be one.
Id. at 1302-03; see also, Wilson, supra note 15, at 552-53 ("The origins and mutability of
one's sexual orientation are unclear. What is clear is that homosexuality is a status
and not merely a chosen activity.").
140 See, e.g., Marcia Barinaga, Is Homosexuality Biological?, Sci., Aug. 30, 1991, at 956
(according to one study, the brain region that governs sexual behavior in homosexual
men has an anatomical form typical of women rather than that found in heterosexual
men); Bruce Bower, Genetic clues tofemale sexuality, Sci. NEws, Aug. 22, 1992, at 117
(pointing out that studies have shown a strong genetic influence on both male and
female homosexuality); Lewis, supranote 17, at 1799 ("The overwhelming psychiatric
evidence demonstrates... that homosexuality is not a matter of simple election but
rather a deep-seated psycho-social phenomenon established in early childhood
years."). See generally LEONARD BARNETT, HOMOSEXUAl=.r.
TIME TO TELL THE TRuTH
45-51 (The Camelot Press Ltd. 1975) (outlining briefly several theories regarding the
causes of homosexuality).
141 Wilson, supra note 15, at 552.
142 Id. at 554.
143 Scott Turner, Comment, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co.: In Praise of Family, 25 NEW
ENG. L. Rxv. 1295, 1321-22 (1991).
144 CuRRY & Cusvoan, supra note 26, at FoRwoRD.
145 Id. Said one businessman, "homosexuality is not a civil right. It's an aberration."
Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Oct. 11, 1992, at 20
136
137
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Discrimination against homosexuals is also pervasive in American society. 1 46 Currently, it is particularly visible in the military setting. 1 4 7 Similarly, the judiciary has also discriminated against
[hereinafter Schmalz, Gay Politics]. Much of homosexuals' emotional disturbance can
be attributed to the persecution and condemnation they suffer in our society. Albert
Ellis, The Happy Humanist: Are Gays and Lesbians Emotionally Disturbed?, Ti HumAsr,
Sept./Oct. 1992, at 33. Most experts agree that there is no correlation between emotional disturbance and homosexuality, as is evidenced by the fact that the American
Psychiatric Association has removed homosexuality from its list of mental disorders.
Id.
146 ConstitutionalStatus Of Sexual Orientation, supra note 133, at 1285-86. Recently,
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a lesbian's application for family health insurance coverage for her lesbian companion because the two were not
married. Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123, 129 (Wis.
CL App. 1992). The court reasoned that the plaintiff was not discriminated against
on the basis of her sexual orientation because the bar against coverage for unmarried
couples applied equally to heterosexual and homosexual employees. Id. at 123.
Another example of the non-uniform treatment lesbians and gay men must tolerate is newspaper managements' refusal to list surviving mates in lesbian and gay obituaries. Post, supra note 10, at 750-51. Post provides a compelling illustration:
Imagine two couples. One heterosexual. One lesbian or gay. Both
have a terminally ill partner. The healthy partner cares for the ill partner in a thousand large and small ways and grieves at the inevitable loss
of the partner to death.
For both couples, the newspaper obituary chronicles the life, civic
involvements, church affiliation and other activities and interests of the
deceased partner. For the heterosexual couple, the surviving spouse is
listed. For the lesbian or gay couple, the surviving partner is not.
Id.
The causes of discrimination against homosexuals is generally beyond the scope
of this Comment. Nonetheless, homophobia is at least partly responsible for producing discrimination. Wilson, supra note 15, at 555. The growing trend of hate crimes
motivated by the sexual orientation of the victim reflects the pervasiveness of
homophobia in this country. SeeJeff Peters, When Fear Turns to Hate and Hate to Vtolence, 18 HUMAN RIGHTs 22, 22 (1991) (assessing that homosexual murders, shootings,
verbal insults, and hate mail have reached an alarmingly high level). Research has
shown that homophobia is similar to ethnic, racial, and religious prejudice. MaryAnn
Dadisman, Roots of Hate: Homophobia at Its Source, 18 HuMAN RIGHTS 24, 24 (1991). But
seeJonathan Alter, Degrees of Discomfort: is homophobia equivalent to racism?, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 12, 1990, at 27 (arguing that there is a distinction between objecting to who
someone is, in the case of racial discrimination, and objecting to what someone does,
in the case of homosexual discrimination).
147 See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding
the Navy's policy of mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct on grounds that
the policy furthers legitimate state interests that include "the maintenance of 'discipline, good order and morale[,] ... mutual trust and confidence among service members' ") (citation omitted). But see Watkins v. United States Army, 551 F. Supp. 212,
222, 223 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384
(1990) (holding that the Army was estopped from relying on a regulation that made
homosexuality a nonwaivable disqualification for reenlistment).
It is hypothesized that the ban against homosexuals in the military started after
World War I when many soldiers returned home shell-shocked and were consequently
institutionalized. Vicki Quade (interview with William Rubenstein), Gays In The Mili-
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homosexuals, especially in the arena of child custody. 148
Finally, homosexuals have less political influence than other
minority groups. 4 9 While the homosexual community has been
gaining some political strength,' this success has been met with a
backlash.' 5 1 For example, many religious leaders openly condemn
homosexuality with more vigor than other alleged moral sins, such
as abortion. 5 2 Additionally, the deadly AIDS virus has 5also
made
3
the homosexuals' quest for equal rights more difficult.'
tary: Finally Being All That You Can Be, 18 HumAN RiGHirs 26, 28 (1991). At the beginning of World War II, the psychiatric profession felt it could reduce the number of
shell-shocked individuals by screening out "sick" people coming into the military. Id.
At the time, homosexuals were considered "sick." Id.
The issue of gays in the military recently rose to the top of the homosexual political agenda with President Clinton's promise to lift the ban prohibiting homosexuals
from serving in the military. Catherine S. Manegold, The Odd Place of Homosexuality in
the Militay, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 18, 1993, at El, 3. Allowing homosexuals to serve in the
military is a sensitive problem because so many diverging views on the issue exist. See
id. (listing the arguments as a question of civil rights, control, combat effectiveness,
and unit cohesiveness). Perhaps the most meritorious argument against homosexuals
in the military is for health reasons. See William J. Gregor, Should the Militaiy End Its
Ban on Homosexuals?No: Ending Ban Poses Risks to Health and Discipline,133 N.J.L.J. 597,
597 (Feb. 22, 1993) (stating that the threat of sexually transmitted diseases, especially
AIDS and hepatitis B, pose a danger to both military and public health). This argument, however, loses viability when it is used to exclude people for illnesses that have
not been contracted yet. See Patricia Schroeder, Should the Military End Its Ban On
Homosexuals? Yes: Opposition to Gays Is Fueled by Fears, Not Facts, 133 N.J.L.J. 597, 607
(Feb. 22, 1993) (maintaining that individuals should not be barred from enlistment
because of the possibility that they may become sick in the future).
148 See, e.g., In reJ.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 489, 498, 324 A.2d 90, 92, 97 (Ch.
Div. 1974), affd, 142 N.J. Super. 499, 501, 362 A.2d 54, 55 (App. Div. 1976) (holding
that a homosexual father's visitation rights should extend only to daytime hours because unrestricted visitation would not be in the best interests of the children). But cf.
M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super 425, 427, 438-39, 404 A.2d 1256, 1257, 1263 (App. Div.
1979) (holding that former wife's homosexuality or any embarrassment that her sexual behavior might cause to the children in the eyes of their peers were not grounds
for change of custody).
149 See Chaitin & Lefcourt, supra note 134, at 41 (observing that minority groups
have traditionally been excluded from participation in the political process, and consequently, "[t]heir interests have not been protected by the legislative process").
150 Homosexual's Right to Marry, supra note 122, at 204.
151 Schmalz, Gay Politics, supra note 145, at 20.
152 Id.

153 See id. at 21, 29 ("Paradoxically, at the very moment when it is entering the
mainstream of American politics, the gay community finds itself drained, beset by
infighting, burnout, illness and death."). By 1990, a minimum of 50,500 homosexuals
had died of AIDS, and at least an additional 82,500 had become infected with the HIV
virus. Eloise Salholz et al.,
The Future Of Gay America, NEwsWEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at 20.
The prevention of AIDS has, in fact, provided a new justification for discriminating
against homosexuals with the virus in housing, employment, and medical care.
GRE
_BERG,
supra note 76, at 479. It has also been argued that AIDS has stimulated
gay activism, consequently increasing the political power of homosexuals. Salholz,
supra, at 20. This power is evidenced, in part, by the fact that there are now about fifty
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It is clear that homosexuals exhibit all of the characteristics
generally associated with suspect status.1 4 Given the pattern of
equating suspectness with race in some form or another, 5 5 however, it is dubious whether the Court will find homosexuals to be a
suspect class. 15 6 Moreover, recent Supreme Court equal protection
jurisprudence implies
a trend away from formulating additional
7
5

suspect classes.1

B.

Why TraditionalEqual ProtectionAnalysis Fails

The Equal Protection Clause is not an adequate mechanism
through which to obtain equal marital rights for homosexuals. 58
The inherent problem with traditional equal protection analysis is
that it requires only that like persons be treated the same.' 5 9 Thus,
the equal protection guarantee actually sanctions unequal treatment of people who are different. 6 °
In short, the Equal Protection Clause is flawed because it inherently undermines human individuality by equating equality with
sameness and inferiority with difference.' Additionally, the Equal
Protection Clause provides no guidelines for establishing whether
people are alike for purposes of equal protection. 62 Moreover,
openly gay elected officials around the United States, a number that has more than
quadrupled since 1980. Id. at 21-22.
Arguably, the AIDS epidemic is a strong justification for legalizing same-sex marriage. Closen & Heise, supra note 54, at 810-11. Same-sex marriage would encourage
long-term monogamous relationships that would unquestionably reduce the spread of
the disease. Id. at 815.
154 Wilson, supra note 15, at 556. See supra notes 128-38 and accompanying text
(listing and discussing the common characteristics of suspect status).
155 ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation, supra note 133, at 1298.
156 See Homosexual's Right to Many, supra note 122, at 206 (pointing out a reluctance
on the part of the judiciary to grant homosexuals suspect class status).
157 Friedman, supranote 12, at 147-48 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
158 See generaUy Friedman, supra note 12, at 146-47 (opining that a due process analysis would require less of the Court in granting homosexuals the right to marry).
159 See Lewis, supra note 17, at 1785 (asserting that under equal protection analysis
"[It]he proclamation of difference, therefore, legitimizes existing inequity").
160 Id.
161 Id. Lewis argued that a "prejudice towards difference, towards those unlike the
norm, is built into equalityjurisprudence." Id. It is the genetic and social differences
of homosexuals, then, that prevent equal treatment under the "similarly situated"
ideal. Id.; see also EdwardJ. Erler, Equal Protectionand PersonalRights: The Regime Of The
"Discreteand Insular Minority", 16 GA. L. REv. 407, 409 (1982) (maintaining that the
Court's recent interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause "has come perilously
close to converting the doctrine of individual rights . . . into a doctrine of class
rights").
162 Lewis, supra note 17, at 1785.
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under equal protection analysis, "[ d] ifference is intelligible only as
a statement of relationship; rather than intrinsic, difference is a
social construct designed to confirm superiority." 16' The equal
protection guarantee, therefore, is an illusory form of protection
for homosexuals who wish to marry because they are inherently
different from heterosexual couples in terms of structure.
A DUE PROCEss ANALYSIS
16 4
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides same-sex couples seeking to marry with an alternative
source of constitutional protection.' 65 The due process guarantee
protects individuals against unwarranted government interference
with marriage, '66 family relationships,16 and procreation.16 This
V.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:

163 Id. at 1786. Another problem with the similarly situated ideal is that courts
might require plaintiffs to establish that women and men are similarly situated with
regard to spousal ability. Friedman, supra note 12, at 146. Judges, however, may not
view marriage functionally, and thus may not see that men and women are equals in
terms of intimacy, companionship, and support. Id. A successful equal protection
challenge could theoretically depend on a court's willingness to view marriage functionally and disregard traditional stereotypes about the roles of men and women in
marriage. Id.
164 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause guarantees protection against
unwarranted government intrusion into rights that are "fundamental" or "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citing
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). In other words, due process protects
against arbitrary decisions. See T.M. SCANLON, DUE PROCESS 93, 94 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman, eds. 1977) (providing a philosophical account of how the
absence of "due process" can support legitimate claims against institutional actions).
Professor Scanlon noted that certain institutions authorize some people to control or
intervene in the lives of others. Id. These institutions do so either directly, by permitting some to command others and exert force to compel obedience, or indirectly, by
conferring upon some the power to control resources or opportunities of others. Id.
The requirement of due process serves as a limitation upon this kind of power. Id.
165 Friedman, supra note 12, at 146-47. A due process analysis centers on the functional aspects of same-sex couples' relationships, instead of the more elusive equal
protection question that focuses on whether the opposite-sex requirement treats men
and women differently. Id. at 152-53. Thus, it is "easier" for the Court to provide
relief under the due process right to privacy. Id. at 146-47.
166 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987) (invalidating state regulation
that infringed upon prisoners' freedom to marry); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (asserting that intimate relationships help protect "the
individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme"); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 375, 382 (1978) (striking statute that required parents under court ordered child support obligations to meet certain financial requirements before being
permitted to marry); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that a
state's denial of access to a divorce violates due process); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (invalidating statute prohibiting interracial marriage based in part on the
recognition of marriage as a "vital personal right").
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protection is based upon the Supreme Court's articulation of a
right to privacy, 169 which assumes that certain personal rights are
167 See e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19 (stating that protecting intimate personal
relationships from state interference "safeguards the ability independently to define
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty") (citations omitted); Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (protecting unwed fathers who had developed
substantial relationships with their children against state interference with that relationship under the Due Process Clause); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385-87,
394 (1979) (invalidating a state statute allowing an unwed father's children to be
adopted without the father's consent); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431
U.S. 494, 496, 499, 506 (1977) (invalidating ordinance that allowed only members of
a single "family" to live together because the ordinance defined family too narrowly);
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)
(citation omitted) ("the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily association"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646, 651-52, 658
(1972) (recognizing right of unwed, biological fathers to maintain relationships with
their illegitimate children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 228-29, 234, (1972)
(protecting Amish parents who declined to send their children to public high school
despite the compulsory education law); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 53435 (1925) (protecting the right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of
their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that liberty "denotes ... the right of the individual to... establish a home and bring up children").
168 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681, 687-90 (1977) (protecting a minor's right to obtain contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154
(1973) (protecting a woman's right to an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
443, 453, 454-55 (1972) (protecting an individual's right to obtain contraceptives,
whether they are married or single); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (protecting married persons' right to use contraceptives).
169 Bloom, supranote 82, at 512-13. See alsoJed Rubenfeld, The Right OfPivacy, 102
HAv. L. REV. 737, 738 (1989) (asserting that Supreme Court privacy decisions have
focused on sexuality including contraception, marriage and abortion).
The right to privacy is similar to natural law in that no express constitutional
guarantee protects the right. Id. at 737. Courts and commentators first found authority for the right to privacy in the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution, which provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id. at 741 (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. IX).
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution guarantees the privacy right.
Buchanan, The Right of Privacy, supra note 82, at 487-88. The Court first expressly
recognized the right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticu4 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Rubenfeld, supra, at 744. The Griswold court struck down a state statute criminalizing
the distribution and use of contraceptives by married persons. Griswold, 381 U.S. at
480, 485-86. The Court proclaimed that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Id. at 484 (citation omitted). This creation of the right to privacy represented a new constitutional protection
designed to serve society's needs. Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices In Search Of A
Doctrine, 64 MicH. L. REv. 219, 228, 233-34 (1966).
Two years after Griswold, the Court in Loving v. Vrginia invalidated a statute
prohibiting interracial marriage based on the right to privacy as well as the Equal
Protection Clause. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1968).
The Court extended its Griswold holding beyond the marital relationship in Eisen-

1993]

COVMENT

379

fundamental, and worthy of significant constitutional protection. 170 Thus, the recognition of marriage as a fundamental
stadt v. Baird. Eisenstad4 405 U.S. at 454-55. The EisenstadtCourt held that the privacy
doctrine protects the right of unmarried persons, as well as married persons, to use
contraceptives. Id. at 453-55; see also Carey, 431 U.S. at 681, 693-94, 699, 700 (striking a
statute that dramatically restricted contraceptive distribution to both minors and
adults).
The privacy right was extended to the abortion context in Roe v. Wade. Roe, 410
U.S. at 153. In Roe, the Court concluded that the right of privacy was broad enough
to include a woman's decision on whether or not to end her pregnancy. Id. The
Court warned, however, that the decision did not allow a woman to terminate her
pregnancy whenever and in whatever manner she chooses. Id. The Court divided
pregnancy into three trimesters, and prescribed a different rule for each, the effect of
which was to increase the difficulty of obtaining an abortion as a pregnancy progresses. See id. at 162-66 (setting forth the specific requirements for obtaining an
abortion at each trimester of a pregnancy).
The privacy doctrine was further expanded with Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
Ohio, in which the Court expressly relied on the Griswold line of cases to invalidate a
zoning ordinance that restricted occupancy of dwelling units to members of a nuclear
family. Moore, 431 U.S. at 495-96, 499.
The Supreme Court's privacy doctrine has been denounced as "elusive and illdefined." Schwarzschild, supra note 4, at 94 (citation omitted). While the Court invoked the right to privacy in the above cases, it has failed to explain what the doctrine
consists of aside from decisions pertaining to contraception, childbearing, and family
matters. Bloom, supra note 82, at 513. The concern of both judges and commentators is that privacy provides judges with a mechanism through which to interpret the
law based on their own personal beliefs about morality. Schwarzschild, supra note 4,
at 94-95. Schwarzschild noted that "[w]hile deemed appropriate for legislatures,
[moral rule-making] is felt to be unsuitably ideological for the judicial role." Id. In
Bowers v. Hardwik, the majority believed that "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194, rehg denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
One commentator has described the privacy decisions relating to marriage, family, and procreation as articulating a "freedom of association." Kenneth L. Karst, The
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 624, 625 (1980). Professor Karst argued
that the "freedom of association" is an effective organizing principle for it is the foundation that most clearly defines our humanity. Id. at 692.
170 Zimmer, supra note 42, at 698. Fundamental rights have been defined as
"[t]hose which have their origin in the express terms of the Constitution or which are
necessarily to be implied from those terms." BLACK'S LAw DICTaONARY 607 (5th ed.
1979) (citations omitted). There is, however, no universally accepted definition of a
fundamental right. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 119, at § 11.7.
Additionally, the Supreme Court justices have not agreed upon which rights are
fundamental for due process purposes. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206, 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (maintaining that individuals have a fundamental interest in
"controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others .... We protect
[fundamental] rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to
the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's
life.") with Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (majority opinion) (defining the right to privacy
much more narrowly: " [W ] e think it evident that none of the rights announced in [the
line of privacy] cases bear[ ] any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy. .. ").
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right 71 would subject any state interference with this right to strict
scrutiny review, requiring the state to prove that the challenged
legislation was the least restrictive means to further a compelling
government interest. 172 Accordingly, the due process right to privacy is a much better weapon than the Equal Protection Clause for
recognizing a marriage between same-sex couples because the marare
riage and family rights embodied in the due process guarantee
173
equally applicable to homosexuals' interest in marriage.
The Court clearly began to narrow the privacy doctrine in the Bowers decision.
See MarkJ. Kappelhoff, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is There A Right To Privacy?, 37 AM.
U. L. REv. 487, 500-01, 512 (1988) (arguing that Bowers conflicted with Supreme
Court precedent and could seriously infringe upon individual liberty interests, especially sexual privacy). In Bowers, a 5-4 majority held that a state could criminalize
homosexual sodomy without violating the right to privacy. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
Hardwick was charged with committing sodomy in his bedroom with another adult
male in violation of a Georgia statute prohibiting sodomy. Id. at 187-88. Although
Hardwick was never indicted, he nevertheless brought suit in the District Court contending that a statute criminalizing sodomy violated the Constitution. Id. at 188.
The Court framed the issue in terms of whether homosexuals have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. Id. at 190. Reasoning that the fundamental fights
espoused in the line of privacy cases apply only to family, marriage, and procreation,
the Court held that the privacy doctrine does not encompass a fundamental right to
homosexual conduct. Id. at 190-91 (citations omitted). The Court stressed that the
line of privacy cases did not permit all consensual sexual conduct. Id. at 191.
The implication of Bowers is that privacy interests will not be considered fundamental unless the asserted right can be connected with marriage, family, or procreation. George W.M. Thomas, Note, Privacy: Right or Privilege: An Examination of Privacy
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 875, 895-96 (1988). Thomas suggested
that an intermediate test regarding the constitutionality of decisions important to an
individual's identity, but not considered fundamental, be employed to give these decisions more meaningful protection. Id. at 896. The unfortunate effect of Bowers is that
the decision allows the states to encroach upon the privacy and associational interests
of many individuals. Mitchell L. Pearl, Note, Chipping Away at Bowers v. Hardwick:
Making the Best of an UnfortunateDecision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 154, 154-55 (1988).
171 Currently, the Court appears to regard marriage as a fundamental right only for
heterosexual couples. See supranote 126 (listing two Supreme Court cases protecting
heterosexual couples' right to marry).
172 See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 686 (demanding that "where a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden
on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn
to express only those interests"); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (explaining that "[w] hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests").
173 Friedman, supra note 12, at 152. Friedman argued that "because the values
served by the institution of marriage-'family values'-are reflected most straightforwardly in [the] substantive due process privacy doctrine, states' failure to recognize
same-sex marriages is most appropriately challenged under that doctrine." Id. As
early as 1923, the Court recognized the right to marry and establish a home as central
to the due process guarantee. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citations
omitted). Later, in Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur,the Court stated that it "ha[d] long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is
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Marriage as a FundamentalRight

In Loving v. Virginia,74 the Supreme Court declared that the
freedom to marry is a fundamental right.'7 5 The Loving Court invalidated a Virginia statutory scheme prohibiting interracial marriage on the grounds that it violated due process of law.' 7 6 The
one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (citations
omitted).
174 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For sources discussing Loving, see Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws And The Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REv. 1224,
1225, 1255 (1966) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to
preclude state laws prohibiting interracial marriage, and suggesting that if the original Constitution is outdated it can be amended pursuant to Article V); Rev. Robert F.
Drinan, S.J., The Loving Decision And The Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 358, 360,
376-79 (1968) (suggesting norms which should guide the states' establishment of marriage regulations against the backdrop of the Loving decision); Walter Wadlington,
The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute In Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L.
REv. 1189, 1190 (1966) (providing a historical background of Virginia's miscegenation laws and its problems); Donald W. Merritt, Recent Case, 17 BuFF. L. REv. 507, 512
(1968) (contending that Loving established marriage as a fundamental legal right entitled to due process guarantees); Sidney L. Moore, Note, 19 MERCER L. REv. 255, 257
(1968) (predicting that Loving stands for a basic change in social philosophy that will
probably endure for many years).
175 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The Court set forth that "[t]he freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id.(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); see also Karst, supranote 169, at 627 (footnote omitted) (stating
that marriage is a "fundamental freedom"); Merritt, supra note 174, at 512 (concluding that Loving affirmed marriage as a fundamental right); Strasser, supra note 16, at
999 (declaring that the individual's interest in marriage is so strong as to be
fundamental).
As early as 1888, the Court recognized marriage as "the most important relation
in life" and as "the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would
be neither civilization nor progress." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888);
see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing the right to
marital privacy as "older than the Bill of Rights .... It is an association that promotes
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living .... Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
536-37, 541 (1942) (invalidating a state statute which provided for mandatory sterilization of certain felons on the grounds it unduly infringed upon the fundamental rights
of marriage and procreation). For a discussion of Skinner, see Note, Constitutionality
Of State Laws Providing Sterilization For Habitual Criminals, 51 YALE L.J. 1380, 1386-87
(1942) (concluding that a due process analysis would have been more appropriate
than the equal protection analysis in Skinner because the statute concerned the right
to have children).
176 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. In 1958, a white male and a black female, both Virginia
residents, were legally married in the District of Columbia. Id. at 2. Upon returning
to Virginia, they were convicted of violating a state statute prohibiting interracial marriage. Id. at 2-3. The Court unanimously reversed the convictions, holding that the
statute was unconstitutional because it was based on invidious racial discrimination in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 12. Rejecting the state's contention
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Court proclaimed that the Constitution protects "the freedom to
marry, or not marry, a person of another race [,]" and the decision
should be an individual one without state interference. 177 This
landmark decision would seem to stand for the freedom to choose
of whether the selected partner is of the same
a spouse, regardless
1 78
or opposite sex.
The Supreme Court in Zablocki v. Redhai,1 79 reiterated that the
right to marry is fundamental.1 8 0 The Court invalidated a Wisconsin law which required that parents under a court order for child
support meet certain financial requirements before being permitted to marry. 8 ' Limiting the Loving Court's declaration of marthat the statute did not constitute an invidious discrimination because it applied
equally to blacks and whites, the Court maintained that a racial classification must still
be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at 8-9. The Court next concluded that no legitimate
purpose existed to support the racial classification. Id. at 11. Holding that the statute
violated due process, the Court stated:
To deny this fundamental freedom on so insupportable a basis as the
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty
without due process of law.
Id. at 12.
177 Id.
178 See Drinan, supra note 174, at 360 (opining that Loving can be interpreted to
represent freedom of choice in selecting a marriage partner); Friedman, supra note
12, at 156 (asserting that the "right to marry protects an individual's choice of a marriage partner"); Rubenfeld, supra note 169, at 745 (interpreting Loving as prohibiting
states from infringing upon the freedom to choose whom to marry).
179 434 U.S. 374 (1978). For sources discussing Zablocki, see Jane C. Atkinson, Note,
Califano v. Jobst, Zablocki v. Redhail, and the FundamentalRight to Mary, 18 U. Louisvwi J. FAam. L. 587, 613 (1980) (recognizing that Jobst and Zablocki fail to define the
parameters of marriage as a fundamental right); John Zawadsky, Note, 1979 Wis. L.
Rzv. 682, 685 (1979) (concluding that because the right to marry is fundamental,
state restrictions can no longer be easily substantiated by way of the traditional deference accorded to the states in the area of family law).
180 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (recognizing that the Court's "past decisions make
clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance"); Zawadsky, supra note
179, at 704 (asserting that Zablocki establishes marriage as a fundamental right). But
see Serena Kafker, Recent Case, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 334, 340 (1978) (cautioning against
placing too much weight on the Zablocki holding, given the dissension among the
Justices regarding the grounds for the decision and the applicability of a strict standard of review).
181 Zablocki 434 U.S. at 375. Specifically, the statute required that the parent comply with the support order, and also demonstrate that the child was not at present
likely to become a public charge. Id.
The Court asserted that marriage is a fundamental right protected by the due
process right to privacy. Id. at 383-84 (citation omitted). The Court recognized:
[T]he decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and
family relationships.... (lI t would make little sense to recognize a right
of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with re-
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riage as a fundamental right, the Zablocki Court warned that not
every state interference relating to marriage would be strictly scrutinized, but only those that substantially infringed upon the right to
18 2
marry.
After Zablocki, the fundamental right to marry appeared to be
firmly entrenched, at least with regard to heterosexuals. 1 3 Given
the Zablocki majority's emphasis on the fundamental nature of the
right to marry, however, it would appear inconsistent to deny this
right to homosexual couples. 8 4 Indeed, the Zablocki decision compels extension of the right to marry to homosexuals because state
prohibition of same-sex marriages constitutes substantial interferspect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of
the family in our society.
Id. at 386. Nonetheless, the statute was invalidated under the equal protection guarantee. Id. at 377, 382. Applying strict scrutiny to the statute, the Court found that it
substantially interfered with the right to marry. Id. at 387-88.
Justice Stewart, concurring, would have based the decision on due process rather
than equal protection grounds because the classification was not discriminatory, and
the Constitution did not expressly guarantee a right to marry. Id. at 391-92 (Stewart,
J., concurring). TheJustice did, however, assert that the right to marry is embraced in
the due process guarantee, and that the statute at issue directly infringed upon that
freedom. Id. at 392-93 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart opined that restricting an indigent from marrying is an irrational means of furthering the legitimate state
goal of reducing the state's welfare load. Id. at 394 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Powell, also concurring, expressed his concern that the majority's rationale was too expansive for an area that had traditionally been left to state regulation.
Id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring). The Justice noted that the Court had never expressly held marriage to be a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny of all state
marriage regulations. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
In the final concurrence, Justice Stevens posited that the statute need only be
subjected to intermediate scrutiny, which it would not withstand regardless, because
the law was irrational in many ways. Id. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist rejected the majority's basic premise that marriage
is a fundamental right requiring more than a rational basis standard of review. Id. at
407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the statute
would pass a rational basis test as an exercise of the state's power to regulate family
life. Id. at 407, 408 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion acknowledging the
lack of guidance from the Zablocki Court regarding the level of scrutiny to be applied
to this penumbral fundamental right, see Nathaniel Abbate, Jr., Note, 56 U. DET. J.
URa.

L. 537, 553 (1979).

Zablocki 434 U.S. at 386. The Court noted that a state may impose reasonable
restrictions that do not interfere significantly with the decision to marry. Id. (citation
omitted).
183 See Schwarzschild, supra note 4, at 102 (noting that the Court's invocation of
strict scrutiny evidences the fundamental character of the right to marry in the heterosexual community); see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (articulating that past Supreme
Court decisions illustrate the fundamental nature of marriage).
184 See generally Karst, supra note 169, at 671 (observing that Zablocki indicates the
beginning of an extensive re-examination of the constitutionality of the state laws
limiting some forms of intimate association).
182
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ence. 18 5 Moreover, the state lacks a compelling interest to justify
the denial of homosexual marriages because same-sex marriages
embody the same esteemed qualities and purposes of a heterosexual marriage, namely, commitment, intimacy, loyalty, and family

values. 8 6
B.

ProcreativePrivacy as a FundamentalRight

Encompassed within the privacy doctrine is an individual's
freedom of choice in all matters pertaining to procreation.18 7 The
right to procreative autonomy and the right to marry are interrelated. 188 Illustrating this relationship is the fact that courts have
used homosexuals' lack of ability to procreate as a justification for
denying same-sex couples the right to marry. 189
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of procreative
freedom in Griswold v. Connecticut.90 In Griswold, the Court upheld
185 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 157 (asserting that Griswold and its progeny indicate that a statute which places obstacles in the way of individuals who want to marry
must survive strict scrutiny to be upheld). Friedman contended, however, that the
current state of the law presents a legal hurdle for same-sex couples who wish to
marry. Id. But see Homosexual's Right to Marry, supranote 122, at 200-01 (arguing that
Zablocki is not useful precedent for enjoining prohibitions against same-sex marriage
because not only did the Court warn against widespread application of its holding,
but it also referred only to heterosexual couples when it characterized marriage as a
fundamental right).
186 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 157 (suggesting that because the values of heterosexual and homosexual couples are the same, restrictions prohibiting homosexual
marriage must be strictly scrutinized); Penas, supra note 13, at 552-53 (positing that
same-sex marriage would promote the fundamental interests of marriage-commitment, loyalty, and intimacy-as well as heterosexual couples). According to one psychologist, "the settled-in qualities of the homosexual couple tend to be precisely those
which characterize the stable heterosexual relationship. The similarities evidenced in
[T]here are clearly more differences between
daily life are especially noticeable ....
individuals and individual couples than there are between kinds of couples." Id.
(2d. ed. 1987)).
(quoting C. TRipp, Ti HOMOSEXUAL MATx
187 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (protecting a
minor's right to obtain contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (protecting a woman's right to an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443, 453-55
(1972) (protecting an unmarried individual's right to obtain contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (protecting married persons' rights
to obtain contraceptives).
188 Treuthart, supra note 5, at 96.
189 See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("[M] arriage
exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of societal values associated
with the propagation of the human race. Further, it is apparent that no same-sex
couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union.").
190 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For sources discussing Griswold, see Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,
The Griswold Penumbra:ConstitutionalCharterfor an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MIcH.
L. Rxv. 197, 218 (1966) (accusing the Court of "play[ing] charades with the Constitution" to reach a commendable result); HerbertJ. Lustig, Note, 17 SYRACUSE L. Rxv.
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the right of married persons to use contraceptives. 1 9 ' The Court
stressed the importance of protecting intimacy within the marital
relationship.' 9 2
553, 556 (1966) (concluding that Griswold failed to denote the parameters of the privacy right); Comment, Privacy After Griswold: ConstitutionalOr Natural Law Right?, 60
Nw. U. L. REv. 813, 832-33 (1966) (noting that the Court had begun to develop the
privacy interest out of the entire constitutional scheme, arguably supporting the notion that the privacy right is a natural law concept); Note, Supreme Court Finds Marital
Privacy Immunized From State Intrusion as a Bill of Rights Periphery, 1966 DuKE L.J. 562,
577 (1966) [hereinafter Supreme Court Finds] (suggesting that the Court has merely
espoused the accepted, although poorly defined, concept of a privacy interest that
establishes two interrelated rights: the right to make decisions regarding family planning, and the right to marital intimacy free from state intrusion).
191 Griswold, 381 U.S at 485-86. The defendants in Griswold were the executive and
medical directors of a Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. Id. at 480. Both directors
were convicted of counselling married persons regarding the use of contraceptives in
violation of a state statute that forbade the use of contraceptives and counselling of
others in their use. Id. (citations omitted). The Court struck down the statute as
violative of married persons' right to privacy. Id. at 485-86.
192 Id. at 482, 485-86. Justice Douglas did not base his decision expressly on substantive due process. See id. at 481-82 (noting that the contraceptive issue invokes many
due process questions). Instead, the Justice opined that several of the Bill of Rights
guarantees protect a "zone of privacy." Id. at 482-85. Concluding that the right of
married persons to use contraceptives fell within this zone, the Court reasoned, "[the
idea of a police search] of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives . . . is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationMarriage is ... intimate to the degree of being sacred." Id. at 485-86.
ship ....
All of the Justices agreed that the law was unconstitutional, and that the Fourteenth Amendment protected only those rights which are fundamental. The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REV. 105, 163 (1965/66). Dissension among the Justices
arose, however, regarding how those fundamental rights were to be discovered. Id.
Justice Goldberg,joined by ChiefJustice Warren andJustice Brennan, authored a
concurring opinion agreeing that the birth control law intruded upon the right to
marital privacy. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The concurrence emphasized the relevance of the Ninth Amendment to the Court's decision. Id.
at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg quoted the Ninth Amendment,
which reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id. at 488 (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX). Recognizing that the Constitution
did not expressly mention the right of marital privacy, Justice Goldberg nonetheless
believed that the Constitution was meant to protect these fundamental rights. See id.
at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing that "as the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as this one, which are
protected from abridgment by the Government though not specifically mentioned in
the Constitution").
Justice Harlan, also concurring, argued that the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause did not merely incorporate the specific Bill of Rights guarantees, but
instead stood on its own to protect those basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Justice White, concurring, also focused on the Due Process
Clause to find that the statute was not narrowly tailored to further the state's policy
against illicit sexual relationships. Id. at 502-05 (White, J., concurring).
Dissenting, Justice Black argued that only those rights expressly protected by the
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird;9 - the Supreme Court extended the Griswold holding to include unmarried individuals. 9 4 The Eisenstadt
Court focused on the importance of reproductive freedom not
only to married people, but also to the individual.' 9 5 This decision
is significant because it represents the first time the Court endorsed the right of an individual to make family choices outside of
the traditional family structure' 9 6
Bill of Rights were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 520-21 (Black, J.,
dissenting). The Justice had certain reservations:
Subjecting federal and state laws to such an unrestrained and unrestrainable judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactments
would . . . jeopardize the separation of governmental powers that the
Framers set up and at the same time threaten to take away much of the
power of States to govern themselves which the Constitution plainly intended them to have.
Id. at 521 (Black, J., dissenting).
Although agreeing with the majority opinion in terms of morality, Justice Stewart,
dissenting, wrote that the birth control law was unconstitutional. Id. at 527 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Like Justice Black, Stewart found no general right of privacy in the Bill
of Rights or in any Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The result of this lack of agreement regarding basic constitutional law provides
little solid guidance from the Court in the privacy area. Supreme Court Finds, supra
note 190, at 577.
193 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
194 Id. at 441-42, 443. At issue in Eisenstadt was a statute that made it a felony for
anyone to distribute contraceptives, except in the case of a registered physician or
pharmacist administering them to married persons. Id. at 440-42. Justice Brennan
phrased the issue in terms of whether the different treatment accorded married and
unmarried persons under the statute was rational. Id. at 447. Rejecting the argument
that the statute deterred pre-marital sexual relationships, the Court concluded that
no rational reason existed for distinguishing treatment between the two. Id. at 443,
447, 448-50. The Court observed that the widespread availability of contraceptives for
disease prevention cast doubt on the legislative purpose of discouraging extra-marital
relations. Id. at 448-49 (citation omitted).
Second, the Court rejected health as the purpose of the legislation, based upon
its history as a moral regulation. Id. at 450, 452. Furthermore, the Court found that if
the statute were legitimately a health measure, it discriminated against single persons.
Id. at 450.
195 Id. at 453 (citations omitted). The majority held that if the statute's sole purpose was to prevent contraception, it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the access rights of married and unmarried individuals must be the same. Id. at 453-55. The Court's reasoning, however, was flavored
with substantive due process. See id. at 453 (citations omitted) (asserting that "[i]f the
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individua4 married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child").
196 Zimmer, supra note 42, at 702; see also, Daniel Ellis, Note, 4 SETON HALL L. REv.
264, 276 (1973) (opining that the effect of Baird is to place the focus on individuals as
opposed to marital or familial relations with regard to sexual privacy); Katherine R.
Jones, Comment, Eisenstadt v. Baird: State Statute ProhibitingDistribution of Contraceptives to Single Persons Void on Equal Protection Grounds, 3 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
56, 69 (1973) (concluding that Baird is the Court's attempt to expand the privacy
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Griswold and Eisenstadt illustrate the illogic of granting reproductive freedom to all individuals while simultaneously restricting
homosexual couples from marrying based upon their presumed inability to procreate. 9 7 If procreation is the sole purpose of marriage, all couples unwilling or unable to have children, whether
homosexual or heterosexual, would, or at least should, be prohibited from marrying. 9 s
C. The ChangingFamily Structure
The right to privacy also embodies the right to free choice in
matters pertaining to the family.' The family is protected because it promotes social stability2" by transmitting society's most
revered values, both moral and cultural. 20 1 In addition, the family
serves as an emotional and economic support system.20 2 Although
28
the traditional family has given way to many alternative forms,
these non-traditional forms are functionally equivalent to the traditional nuclear family insofar as these "families" promote the same
values and interests.20 4
interest to include an individual's freedom to decide whether to have a child without
unwarranted government interference).
197 See generally Friedman, supra note 12, at 158 (arguing that the Court's refusal to
sanction homosexual marriage is at odds with the right to privacy).
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (establishing
"the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing
that the rights to family and marriage are "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
200 Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1287.
201 Moore v. East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977). President Ronald
Reagan has proclaimed:
Strong families are the foundation of society. Through them we pass on
our traditions, rituals, and values. From them we receive the love, encouragement, and education needed to meet human challenges. Family life provides opportunities and time for the spiritual growth that
fosters generosity of spirit and responsible citizenship.
Friedman, supra note 12, at 134 n.1 (quoting WHrrE HOUSE WORKING GROUP ON THE
FAMILY PRESERVING AM±ruc:A's FUTURE epigraph (1986) (quoting Ronald Reagan in
the Proclamation of National Family Week (November 15, 1984))).
202 Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1215. The family also provides a forum
for the development of social skills. Id.
203 See supra notes 6, 11, and accompanying text (discussing the changing American
family).
204 Treuthart, supra note 5, at 91-92. For example, permanence is one characteristic of marriage and family that spawns stability for the individual and society by providing a forum for emotional support. Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1283.
Permanence is equally likely to be found in either a homosexual or a heterosexual
relationship because a successful relationship is characterized by the same attributes,
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Significantly, the judiciary has begun to acknowledge and protect non-traditional families.2 °5 For example, the Supreme Court
20 6
extended the definition of family in Moore v. East Cleveland, Ohio,
to include an extended familial structure, rather than the limited
traditional nuclear composite. 0 7 The Moore Court invalidated a
zoning ordinance, which allowed only members of a single family2°8 to live together, on grounds that the ordinance defined family too narrowly. 2° The plurality held that the Constitution
such as the couple's abilities to compromise and resolve conflicts. Homosexual's Right
To Mary, supra note 122, at 197-98. Furthermore, the homosexual community is
more monogamy-oriented than many people realize. Id. at 197. Thus, permanence is
even more likely to exist in a homosexual relationship because a successful committed
homosexual relationship may be stronger because the couple has stayed together
without society's support. Id. at 198.
205 See infra notes 206-14 (discussing Moore v. East Cleveland; Ohio, 431 U.S. 494
(1977), and Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989), two cases that addressed the constitutionality of laws affecting non-traditional families).
206 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The constitutionality of restricting one's choice of household companions first arose in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas. Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1974). The Belle Terre ordinance restricted land use solely to
one-family dwellings, and defined "family" as persons related by blood, adoption, or
marriage that lived and cooked together as a single unit. Id. at 2. Six unrelated college students leased a home in Belle Terre, and, along with the owner of the house,
were subsequently found in violation of local zoning ordinances. Id. at 2-3.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, began with a broad reaffirmation of the
deference traditionally afforded local zoning regulations. Id. at 3-5. Declaring that
the ordinance did not implicate any constitutional fundamental rights, such as voting
or privacy rights, theJustice rejected the students' allegations of infringement of their
fundamental rights to privacy, association, and travel. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
Instead, the Court characterized the ordinance as "economic and social legislation,"
that only needed to be rationally related to a permissible state objective to pass equal
protection scrutiny. Id. at 8. Justice Douglas found the Belle Terre objectives of securing family values and "the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air" sufficient to
sustain the ordinance. Id. at 9.
Dissenting, Justice Marshall argued that the ordinance significantly burdened the
fundamental rights of privacy and association guaranteed by the Constitution, and
that strict scrutiny should have been applied. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
Justice stressed the interrelationship between the freedom of association and the right
to privacy as a basis for the students' right to live together. Id. at 15-16 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Marshall, an individual's choice of "family, friends,
professional associates, or others" as household companions deserves constitutional
protections. Id. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04.
208 The ordinance defined family as encompassing only certain biological and marital relationships. Id. at 496 n.2. A woman who lived with her two grandsons, who
were cousins, challenged the ordinance because the group did not constitute a family
as defined by the ordinance. Id. at 496-97.
209 Id. at 506. Writing for the plurality, Justice Powell noted that family freedoms
are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 499
(citations omitted). The Justice asserted that government intrusions upon the family
must be carefully scrutinized. Id. Although minimizing traffic and over-crowding
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protected extended familial relationships because such relationships occupied a place in the American tradition similar to the nuclear family. 1°
were legitimate goals, the Justice posited that the ordinance in question did not rationally further these goals. Id. at 499-500.
Justice Powell next pointed out the danger of deciding which liberties should be
protected under substantive due process without extensive guidance from the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 501-02. The Court resolved this problem by admonishing respect for
societal values. Id. at 503.
210 Id. at 503-06. Specifically, the Court set forth:
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition .... Ours is by no means a tradition
limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear
family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.
Id. at 503-04.
Five disparate opinions accompanied the plurality opinion authored by Justice
Powell and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 495. Justice
Brennan, concurring, emphasized the closed-mindedness of the ordinance insofar as
it ignored large segments of society of which the extended family consisted. Id. at
507-08 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, also concurring, maintained that
East Cleveland's ordinance constituted a taking of property without due process of
law or just compensation. Id. at 521 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger dissented, reasoning that because an administrative remedy-a local zoning variance-was available, a constitutional issue did not exist until
available administrative remedies had been exhausted. Id. at 521, 528 (Burger, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stewart, also dissenting, asserted that Belle Terre should be controlling. Id. at 534 (Stewart, J., dissenting). East Cleveland's ordinance, the Justice asserted, was rationally related to the same legitimate purposes articulated in Belle Terre,
such as family values and quiet seclusion. Id. at 534, 539 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The
final dissenter, Justice White, stressed that the substantive due process doctrine
should be used with extreme caution, and that application to the facts in the case at
bar stretched that doctrine too far. Id. at 544, 549 (White,J, dissenting). The Justice
concluded that the facts at issue did not implicate any due process rights, and that the
statutory classification should be sustained absent a reasonable justification. Id. at 551
(White, J., dissenting).
For sources discussing Moore, see Frederick E. Dashiell, Note, The Right of Family
Life: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 6 BLACK L.J. 288, 295 (1980) (concluding that
the Moore decision is especially important to black family life because of the economic
and social plight of black citizens); Mark Langstein, Note, ConstitutionallyProtectedNotions of Family: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 19 B.C. L. REv. 959, 973 (1978) (pointing out that although Moore established constitutional protection for family
autonomy, the parameters of this protection are unclear); Margaret A. MacFarlane,
Comment, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio: The Emergence of the Right of Family
Choice in Zoning, 5 PEPPEIDNE L. REv. 547, 572 (1978) (proposing that the state
should define family according to the degree of emotional ties exhibited as opposed
to blood relations); KatheJ. Tyrrell, Comment, 6 HorsTRA L. Rxv. 1087, 1100 (1978)
(predicting that Moore is the first step toward full protection of a "personal lifestyle
right"); see also United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529, 532-33
(1973) (holding that the federal government could not constitutionally limit the benefits of food stamps to households of related individuals). But see Michael H. v. Gerald
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Similarly, state courts have also begun to acknowledge alternative family forms including homosexual relationships. 21 ' Recently,
in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 212 New York's highest court held that
the term family, as used in the non-eviction provision of New York
City's rent-control laws, protected an unmarried lifetime gay partner and not just persons related by blood or law. 215 The court asserted that the law allowing rent succession "should not rest on
fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should
find its foundation in the reality of family life." 214 More recently, in
In Re Guardianshipof Kowalski,2 15 the Minnesota Court of Appeals
held that a lesbian partner had a right to be appointed guardian of
D., 491 U.S. 110, 121, 127, 129 (1989) (denying a non-biological father visitation
rights even though he maintained a substantial relationship with the child); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2-3, 7 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance that
prevented most groups of unrelated persons from living together because such persons had no fundamental right to live together). Michael H. and Village of Belle Terre
seem to indicate a reluctance by the Supreme Court to protect alternative family arrangements. Cox, supra note 11, at 23.
211 See In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791, 797 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (awarding a woman guardianship of her lesbian partner on the grounds that
they constituted a "family of affinity"); State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191, 1193
(Ohio CL App. 1991) (proclaiming that a partner in a same-sex couple was protected
under Ohio's Domestic Violence Act); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 5051, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that "family" as used in the rent-control laws included
an unmarried lifetime gay partner); Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.,
187 Cal. Rptr. 869, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (remanding to a review board to determine whether petitioner, as the gay partner of the deceased employee, was a dependent covered by the Workers' Compensation Act); Bramlett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80,
85 (Ark. 1980) (imposing a constructive trust upon property settled in one man's
name for the benefit of his male partner); Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901, 902-03, 904
(Ga. 1979) (imposing an implied trust on the proceeds for the living partner who had
supplied part of the purchase money, after the house shared by a gay couple was
destroyed by fire). But see In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991)
(holding that a lesbian non-biological parent did not have standing to seek visitation
rights with the child she and her ex-partner shared); In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471
N.W.2d 202, 204, 212 (Wis. 1991) (refusing to protect a nonlegal parent and child of
an alternative family).
212 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (plurality decision).
213 Id. at 53-54. Mr. Braschi, the gay partner of the tenant in a rent-controlled apartment, was granted a preliminary injunction to stay an eviction proceeding after his
partner died. Id. at 50-51.
214 Id. at 53. The court delineated that this "reality" could be assessed by factors
such as degree of emotional commitment and interdependence, interwoven social
life, financial interdependence, cohabitation, and exclusivity. Id. at 55. The Braschi
holding is essentially limited to its facts, however, because it avoided the constitutional
issues, and instead centered on interpretation of the relevant statutes. Post, supra
note 10, at 750.
215 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. App. 1991). In Kowalsk, the plaintiff fought for legal
guardianship of her lesbian partner who was incapacitated as a result of a serious car
accident. Id. at 791. The lower court named the victim's father as guardian, and the
court of appeals reversed. Id. at 791, 797.

1993]

COMMENT

391

her disabled partner because the relationship constituted a "family
of affinity."

216

VI.

CONCLUSION

217
Same-sex couples are not at present permitted to marry.
Consequently, gay and lesbian couples are denied the legal, emotional, and economic benefits that are automatically bestowed
upon legally married couples. 2 11 While legal alternatives to marriage such as adult adoption, domestic partnership, and contracts
provide some recourse to homosexual couples, 2 19 each ultimately
fails as a solution because these options do not adequately define
the relationship or the rights conferred.2 20 The limited scope of
these alternatives illustrates the inherent unfairness of precluding
lesbian and gay marriages.
The significance of the right that is being denied to homosexual couples cannot be underestimated. The Supreme Court has
described marriage as "the most important relation in life," 22 ' and
has even characterized it as a fundamental right. 22 2 Marriage and
family are clearly interrelated. 223 Although the traditional family
form has been subsumed by many alternative family forms, including families headed by same-sex couples,22 4 these alternative families are often refused the benefits automatically granted to legally
recognized families. 225 Because non-traditional families are functionally equivalent to the heralded traditional families insofar as

Id. at 797.
Schmalz, In Hawaii, supra note 109, at A14; see also Singer v. Hara, 552 P.2d
1187, 1188, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (affirming a state's refusal to issue a marriage
license to two men);Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. CL App. 1973) (upholding the denial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple); Burkett v. Zablocki, 54
F.R.D. 626, 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (dismissing an action by two females seeking an
order compelling the county clerk to issue an application for a marriage license);
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972) (upholding a state statute denying a marriage license to same-sex couples).
218 See supra note 20 (listing and discussing legal and economic benefits of
marriage).
219 See supra notes 39-74 and accompanying text (discussing and evaluating the alternatives to marriage).
220 Zimmer, sup-a note 42, at 688.
221 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
222 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (declaring "the right to
marry is of fundamental importance"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing marriage as a "vital personal right").
223 Treuthart, supra note 5,at 96.
224 Minow, supra note 6, at 930-32.
225 Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 14, at 1640.
216

217
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they promote the same values and interests, 226 the current jurisprudence in this area must be re-examined and changed to protect all
families equally.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects against legislation that infringes upon certain individual
rights227 by requiring only that all persons similarly situated with

respect to a statute's purpose be treated alike. 22' This underlying
premise of the Equal Protection Clause, however, makes the equal
protection argument an inadequate mechanism through which to
obtain equal marital rights for same-sex couples because it equates
equality with sameness and inferiority with difference.229 Consequently, the fact that same-sex couples are inherently different
from heterosexual couples works to their detriment under traditional equal protection analysis.23 °
The due process right to privacy provides same-sex couples
with a much more formidable weapon because it protects individuals against unreasonable interference with marital 23 ' and family reAlthough the
lationships, 232 and procreation decisions. 23 3
traditional American family has evolved into an array of alternative
forms, these non-traditional forms parallel the traditional family in
terms of furthering the same values and interests, such as commitment, loyalty, and intimacy. 2 4 The close similarity between families headed by same-sex couples and those lead by heterosexual
couples demands that same-sex couples have the same opportunity
to legally marry, and, consequently, have equal access to the social
and economic benefits of the marital relationship. Given the
changing family structure, courts accordingly have taken the first
Treuthart, supra note 5, at 91-92.
227 Wilson, supra note 15, at 548-49.
228 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (citation omitted).
229 Lewis, supra note 17, at 1785.
230 See id. (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause is flawed because it undermines human individuality).
231 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375, 382 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring parents under child support obligations to meet certain financial requirements before being permitted to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (invalidating Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriage).
232 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (asserting
that family relationships protect "the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme"). See supra note 167 (listing additional cases protecting the family).
233 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (upholding a woman's right to
choose to abort); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 454-55 (1972) (protecting an
unmarried individual's right to obtain contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (protecting married persons' rights to obtain contraceptives).
234 Friedman, supra note 12, at 169; Penas, supra note 13, at 552-53.
226
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steps toward extending the right to marry to homosexuals. 3 5
While these steps are laudable, they fall short of conferring upon
homosexuals the cornucopia of rights afforded to heterosexuals.
Only by recognizing the legitimacy of same-sex marriage will the
homosexual population be adequately protected by the laws.
Jennifer L. Heeb
235 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (1993) (remanding to trial court for
determination of whether denial of same-sex marriage can withstand strict scrutiny
analysis under Hawaii's equal protection laws).

